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MIGRANT ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN BEIJING
Margaret Y.K. Woo,t Christopher Day,tt & Joel Hugenberger t tt
I.

Introduction

In the last three decades, approximately 140 million Chinese-an estimated
3.2 million in Beijing alone-have migrated to cities from rural towns and villages left behind during China's great economic leap forward.1 This migration
has occurred despite a government policy of pervasive and strict migration control, called the household registration or hukou system, which has never officially
sanctioned movement into large cities. 2 China's rural-to-urban wave is vast not
just in its sheer numbers but especially in its effect on Chinese society. 3 While
t
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to the support of my parents, Linda and David Day, and the lovely Kathryn Galbraith.
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J.D. candidate, Boston College Law School, 2007; Managing Editor, Boston College Law Review; B.A., Middlebury College, 2001. I would like to thank my parents, my siblings, and my fiancde
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ttft
This paper cites interviews conducted with scholars, officials, practitioners, and migrants working in the Beijing legal aid community in summer 2005. Because of the sensitivity of the information
contained, only some specific information is given in the citations. To learn more about these interviews
or the subjects herein, please contact the authors. The authors would also like to thank our interview
subjects who shared their insights and assisted us with our research, often at substantial personal costs.
Particular thanks to Prof. L, CQH, WF, and CXF.
I See China's Floating Population Tops 140 Million, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, July 27, 2005, http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/27/eng20050727_198605.html; see also BEIJING SHI TONGJIJU 2003
NIAN GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI FAZHAN TONGJI GONGBAO [2003 National Economic and Social Development Statistical Report] (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/reldetail.jsp-?docid
=141551 (noting that there are 4 million non-officially registered citizens in Beijing's total population of
14.5 million, of which roughly 20% (3.19 million) are migrant laborers or entrepreneurs). The precise
number of migrants is, for a variety of reasons, difficult to determine with accuracy. See DOROTHY
SOLINGER, CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: PEASANT MIGRANTS, THE STATE, AND THE LOGIC
OF THE MARKET 17-18 (1999) (noting the disparate population estimates of migrants and showing that

temporary migration patterns and difficulties in coaxing illegal migrants to cooperate with official Chinese surveys may skew population numbers). Independent sources claim that official statistics may substantially undercount the population in Beijing, leading the government to grossly underestimate the
number of social workers required to service migrant populations. See Interview with several attorneys
at a leading advocacy firm, in Beijing (Aug. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Advocacy Attorneys].
2 See generally Hein Mallee, Migration, Hukou and Resistance in Reform China, in CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden, eds., 2d ed. 2003); FElLING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION AND EXCLUSION: CHINA'S Hukou System (2005). Although the hukou system has undergone substantial reforms in recent years, reports of its demise have
been greatly exaggerated. See Joseph Kahn, China to Drop Urbanite-Peasant Legal Differences, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A8 (reporting that several provinces have decided to abandon the hukou system).
But see CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM. ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2006, at 116 & n.21 (2006), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt06/CECCannRpt2006.pdf [hereinafter CECC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting that the provincial reforms in 2005 were insubstantial because migrants must still
obtain a local urban hukou in order to receive many social services). See generally Fei-Ling Wang,
Research Report-Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China's Hukou System in the
2000s, 177 CHINA Q. 115 (2004) (highlighting how recent reforms, far from discarding the hukou system,
have entrenched its legitimacy and unfairly targeted poor, rural migrants).
3 See generally SOLINGER, supra note 1; LI ZHANG, STRANGERS IN THE CITY: RECONFIGURATIONS
OF SPACE, POWER, AND SOCIAL NETWORKS WITHIN CHINA'S FLOATING POPULATION (2001).
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migration has given China's rural peasants some benefit from the country's economic gains, it has also created an urban underclass that is denied essential social
4
services and susceptible to abuse from both local residents and fellow migrants.
Separated from traditional familial and village support, these migrants test the
efficacy of China's legal system in protecting those most vulnerable.
Concurrent with market reforms and mass migration, China has touted the
"rule of law" as the means and legitimacy of its governance. 5 New legal institutions have been established, reams of legislation passed, and the lawyer's bar
revived. 6 The Chinese government has encouraged its citizens to file their grievances in the courts rather than air their discontent in the streets-a serious concern in a country where protests have intensified in recent years. 7 With
significant assistance from the international community and grassroots organizations within the country, the government has established an ambitious but underfunded legal aid program to redress widespread injustices against its poorest residents and to foster respect for the rule of law. 8 In response, citizens have seized
4

See

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCLUSION:

THE TENUOUS LEGAL STATUS OF

INTERNAL MIGRANTS IN CHINA'S MAJOR CITIES 59-64 (2002), availableat http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/10528 [hereinafter INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCLUSION] (describing the litany of discriminatory

measures that Beijing regulations place on migrants without temporary residency permits, including the
inability to rent housing legally, get a job, or start a business). The abuse of migrant populations runs the
gamut-from sexual harassment of female migrant workers to the razing of entire migrant villages. See
id. at 9 1-100 (stating that migrants are subject to a range of abuses in the workplace, including exposure
to hazardous conditions, unpaid wages, and physical violence); SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 243-45 (noting that up to 40% of the migrants in Beijing are female and are subject to frequent sexual harassment);
Xin Frank He, Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants in Beijing: InstitutionalConflict and Ineffective Campaigns, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 177, 184 (2003) [hereinafter Regulating Rural-UrbanMigrants] (reporting
that Beijing authorities razed migrant villages in periodic efforts to crack down on migrants living illegally in the city).
5 See generally STANLEY B.

LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA

(1999);

RANDALL

PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002); PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE
LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE (2001). The content and definition of

"rule of law" are disputed, but it is generally used to refer to the admittedly Western notion that legal
principles should guide people's behavior and legal institutions should be free from political pressure.
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997). "Rule of law" is translated asfazhi in Chinese. A homonym using a different
Chinese character means "rule by law," leading to an obvious word play for those inclined to note
China's schizophrenic and instrumentalist attitude towards law. See Yuanyuan Shen, Conceptions and
Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law Reform in Modem China, in THE LIMITS
OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 20, 24 (2000); Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency

and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China,
19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161, 167 n.23 (2001).

6 See generally LUBMAN, supra note 5 (examining the development and reform of China's legal
system and lawyer's bar).
7 See, e.g., Philip Pan, "High Tide" of Labor Unrest in China: Striking Workers Risk Arrest to
Protest Pay Cuts, Corruption, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2002, at A01 (placing the number of labor disputes
at eighty a day); see also VIRGINIA HARPER Ho, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR LABOR DISPrUTES AND LEGAL REFORM 2-3 (2003) (stating that "[the] rise in strikes, demonstrations,

and more violent forms of worker protest have brought labor relations to the fore").
8 See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 211 (1999) (tracing the establishment of China's legal aid system and the problems it faces); see also
Allen Choate, Legal Aid in China (Asia Foundation, Working Paper No. 12, 2000), available at http://
www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/wpl2.pdf. For the role of Chinese NGOs in China's legal reform generally,
see C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role for NongovernmentalOrganizations,25 YALE J. INT'L
L. 363 (2000).
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upon these changes, adopted the language of rights, and filed lawsuits in record
numbers. 9

This article examines the interaction between these two cataclysmic changes:
rural-to-urban migration and the rapid development of China's fledgling legal
institutions, as brokered through legal aid. Other studies have adeptly explored
how substantive laws affect migrant populations and how migrants respond to the
law.' 0 This article, however, will assess whether and how migrants in Beijing
access the courts through legal aid in seeking resolution to their disputes."' To
the extent that "rule of law" entails formal rules and institutions, rather than discretionary powers, it is important to analyze whether formal legal institutions are
open to the needs of ordinary citizens such as migrants. The obstacles
these
2
migrants face could predict the success of the "rule of law" in China.'
9 See LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 224-38, 255 (noting the rise in reported civil cases and the shrinking
role of mediation committees and mediators in resolving disputes). Despite the rise in litigated claims,
most instances of perceived injustice are likely to be tolerated rather than litigated. See Neil J. Diamant
et al., Law and Society in the People's Republic of China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE,
SOCIETY, AND POssIBILrrIES FOR JUSTICE 3, 7 (Neil J. Diamant et al., eds., 2005).
10 See generally He, supra note 4; Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaignsas a Means
of Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-UrbanMigrant Enclave in Beijing, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
121 (2003) [hereinafter Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaigns];Xin Frank He, Why Do They Not Comply with the Law? Illegality and Semi-Legality among Rural-Urban MigrantEntrepeneurs in Beijing, 39
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 527 (2005) [hereinafter Why Do They Not Comply with the Law?]. A couple of

student-written law review notes have also examined aspects of rural migrants' experience with the law.
See generally Ling Li, Note, Towards a More Civil Society: Mingong and Expanding Social Space in
Reform-Era China, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149 (2001); Hayden Windrow & Anik Guha, Note,
The Hukou System, Migrant Workers, & State Power in the People's Republic of China, 3 Nw. U. J.
INT'L HUM. RTS. 3 (2005).
II This article will not address migrants' experience with the criminal justice system, which is, to a

significant degree, still opaque to foreigners. The Chinese government has technically made legal aid for
criminal defendants the responsibility of the state and has allowed legal aid organizations to represent
indigent accused criminals regardless of residency status under certain conditions. See Regulations on
Legal Aid, art. 11, 15 (adopted July 16, 2003 by the St. Council, effective Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/ResidencySocWelfare/regsLegalAid.php. In fact, criminal cases
comprise the majority of cases that most legal aid offices handle. Choate, supra note 8, at 20. However,
the reality is that many criminal defendants do not receive legal representation, probably because of
official intimidation. Furthermore, it is unclear how many migrants in particular are represented; indeed,

migrant criminal defendants may make unpalatable clients, because, rightly or not, they are blamed for
the perceived upsurge in crime in urban areas. See SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 131-34. See generally
Guoan Ma, Population Migration and Crime in Beijing, China, in CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN A
CHANGING CHINA 65 (Jianhong Liu et al., eds., 2001). Suffice it to say, with respect to any criminal
defendants, the well-known problems with China's criminal justice system, rather than access to legal
representation, is likely the far greater impediment to justice. See CECC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 2, at 42-60 (recounting the use of torture and arbitrary detention on criminal suspects and frequent
criminal detentions based on an individual's political opinions or membership in ethnic, religious, or
social groups).
12 In discussing migrant access to courts, this paper does not directly examine all of the potential
routes to redress, as encompassed by the phrase "access to justice." For a fuller discussion on the relationship between the concepts of "access to justice" and "rule of law," see Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant
Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, in

ACCESS TO JUSTICE,

I: WORLD SURVEY 3, 6 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, eds., 1978); Bryant G. Garth, Access to
Justice, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBB3EAN 88, 88 (1995); Joel B. Grossman &
VOL.

Austin Sarat, Access to Justice and the Limits of Law, 3 L. & POL'Y Q. 125, 129 (1981); see also

ASIAN
DISCOURSES OF THE RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN
COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom, ed., 2004) (noting the importance of access to

justice to governmental efforts to establish rule of law in China and several other countries). Recent
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Migrant access to courts is a recent phenomenon. Prior to 2003, migrants
lacking urban temporary residency permits had little access to courts or other
dispute resolution institutions.' 3 Migrants were unable to exercise their legal
rights in part because many cities refused to provide them legal aid. Admittedly,
considering the plethora of problems migrants face-including their difficult living conditions and fear of being sent back to their home villages-and the wellnoted problems within China's legal system, going to court is often not the best,
and certainly not the first, recourse for the vast majority of migrants.' 4 Other
legal avenues of redress, such as mediation, arbitration, and petitioning government officials, are frequently utilized first. But, given the unequal bargaining
power between migrants and Beijing employers, these routes are often biased
against migrants. 15 Growing discontent within the migrant population, as well as
pressure from both citizens and foreign governments, prompted the Chinese government to promote greater utilization of formal dispute resolution mechanisms
for migrants. 16 This shift is all the more notable because it occurs against a
backdrop of local and national policies that have systematically denied essential
services to this population.' 7 In response, migrants have increasingly turned to
courts, despite their arguable lack of success.
scholarship indicates that the peasants and migrants who use formal legal channels to resolve their disputes often do not report having achieved "justice." See generally Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the
Law in China: "Informed Disenchantment" and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 783 (2006) (examining legal aid plaintiffs in Shanghai and concluding that their experience
with the law leads to disenchantment, but also further, better informed action); Ethan Michelson, Justice
from Above or Justice from Below? Popular Strategiesfor Resolving Grievances in Rural China, 187
CHINA Q. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=922072
(reporting that local solutions to grievances in rural China are more successful and lead to greater satisfaction than appealing to higher authorities or the court system).
13 Up until 2003, several cities limited legal aid to local hukou holders or those with temporary
residency permits. See CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM. ON CHINA, FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND TRAVEL, ANNUAL REPORT: 2004, at n.557 (2004) [hereinafter CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://
www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/Residency/annRptO4section.php
(citing Guangdong sheng fald
yuanzhu tiaoli [Guangdong Province Legal Aid Regulations], art. 10(l) (issued Aug. 20, 1999); Zhejiang
sheng fali yuanzhu tiaoli [Zhejiang Province Legal Aid Regulations], art. 7 (issued Oct. 29, 2000);
Shaanxi sheng fald yuanzhu tiaoli [Shaanxi Province Legal Aid Regulations], art. 8 (issued Sept. 25,
2001)); see also Liebman, supra note 8, at 244-45 (noting that as of 1998, many legal aid offices refused
to service migrants); Choate, supra note 8, at 20-21 (stating that as of 2000, legal aid clients were usually
required to be a resident of the area in which the legal aid center was located).
14 See CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 72 (stating that the "formal legal system is
almost entirely. absent from the lives of most of China's citizens").
15 See Ho, supra note 7, at 36-82 (examining the Chinese labor dispute resolution system of engaging in mediation and arbitration before litigation). See generally Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in
China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245 (1992) (examining the Chinese form of mediation); Philip C.C. Huang, Court
Mediation in China, Past and Present, 32 MODERN CHINA 275 (2006); Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An
Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 ST'AN. J. INT'L L. 103 (2006) (examining the process
of seeking legal redress through "letters and visits" to government officials).
16 See Roundtable Before the Cong.-Executive Comm. on China, 108th Cong. 7 (2004), available at
http://frwebgate.acess.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname+ 108_househearings&docid=F:95346.wais.
17 See CONG.-ExEcUTIVE COMM. ON CHINA, CHINA'S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM: SUSTAINED REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA'S RURAL MIGRANTS 7-10 (2005), available at http://cecc.

gov/pages/news/hukou.pdf?PHPSESSID=7b27a8b081aedO87c6eO7520aclla779

(highlighting

China's

discrimination against migrants, particularly in receiving education and health insurance).
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Legal aid is crucial for migrant access to courts for several reasons. Although
a growing number of parties in civil cases represent themselves in China's courts,
the technicalities of a lawsuit make bringing a case to court without legal assistance difficult even for ordinary Chinese citizens, let alone uneducated rural migrants. Migrants typically lack the bargaining power and knowledge of local law
to argue successfully and often cannot afford even the minimum court filing fees,
not to mention lawyers. 18 A few registered Chinese lawyers represent clients on
a contingency fee basis, but many are reluctant to represent migrants because of
an entrenched cultural bias and the fear that migrants will abscond with the fees,
which by law go to the client first.19 Registered lawyers are less likely to accept
migrant cases, both because these cases involve minor amounts and are therefore
not profitable, and because culturally they look down on migrant laborers as uneducated. 20 While most migrants are unable to afford legal representation, they
are also more likely to need it because they are particularly susceptible to workplace injuries, non-payment of wages, and other forms of exploitation. 2' Legal
aid, when available, is often a migrant's first contact with the formal legal system
and the "gatekeeper" to a migrant's use of the courts. 22 A migrant's access to
justice, therefore, is tied as equally to the limitations of legal aid as to the court
system through which legal aid operates.
China is a huge country, and disaggregation of the population is necessary to
understand how policies have had differing impacts. 23 In terms of subject matter,
although several studies have focused generally on legal aid or labor disputes in
18 See Benjamin L. Liebman, Class Action Litigation in China, Il1 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1534
(1998) (examining the impact of court fees); Margaret Y.K. Woo & Yaxin Wang, Civil Justice in China:
An Empirical Study of Courts in Three Provinces, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 920-23 (2005) (noting the
disparate levels of attorney representation in rural versus urban areas). The typical salary of a migrant
nationwide is estimated to be 1,100 yuan ($137.50). See Migrant Workers Expect Higher Monthly Salaries, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 7, 2006, availableat http://china.org.cn/english/null/157162.htm. To
alleviate the burden of court fees on migrants, the Beijing Higher People's Court recently ruled that
migrant workers who file cases against their employers would not have to pay court fees. See Migrant
Workers Get Legal Help To Claim Owed Wages, CHINA DAILY, July 27, 2005, available at http://au.
china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t205034.htm. Whether this ruling has been effectively followed is unclear;
the attorneys we talked to in August 2005 did not mention it.
19 See Ethan Michelson, The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to Justice: Chinese Lawyers at Work,
40 LAW AND SoC'Y REV. 1, 18-21 (2006); see also SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 54 (stating that officials
and urban residents viewed migrants as "almost a pariah class" and as "subjects, never as citizens").
20 See generally Michelson, supra note 19 (exploring Chinese lawyers' systematic denial of access to
legal services through screening of poor laborer and migrant cases because of a lack of economic incentive and cultural biases). Because Professor Michelson limited his findings to registered lawyers taking
cases on a fee-basis and excluded legal aid providers, or even registered lawyers who are assigned migrant cases in satisfaction of pro bono requirements, one cannot draw from his article a more general (and
more pessimistic) conclusion that migrants have no legal recourse.
21 See INSTITUTIONALIZED ExcLUSION, supra note 4, at 93-100. Legal aid organizations thus have an
almost bottomless well of potential cases from which to draw, which leads some to select particularly
egregious but easily proveable cases of injustice. See Interview with American Law Professor Teaching
in China, in Beijing (Aug. 8, 2005).
22 See Michelson, supra note 19, at 1.
23 See Neil J. Diamant, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in China: Beyond Mediation-CenteredApproaches,44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 523 (2000) (urging a disaggregated study of China's population and its
relationship to the law).
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China, most have not addressed in detail migrant involvement in either. 24 In
terms of geography, Beijing, as the seat of government (not to mention the host
of the 2008 Olympiad) is a bellwether for the government's efforts to establish
more meaningful access to legal institutions. Not surprisingly, lawyers, legal institutions, and legal aid are more abundant in Beijing, and therefore the city
of the state of migrant
serves as an illustrative, if not representative, example 25
access to legal institutions in China's other urban areas.
This article examines the legal aid providers available to migrant workers in
Beijing, the forms of aid they provide, and the ways in which they broker "justice." These legal aid providers can be roughly divided into six categories depending on their structure and level of government involvement: governmentsponsored legal aid, migrant-based initiatives, advocacy law firms, communitybased organizations, individual attorneys, and law school clinics. 26 Despite their
level of cooperation, these various legal aid providers often reflect different, if
not divergent, goals in providing aid to migrants. 27 Through extensive interviews
and case studies, this article follows the experience of Beijing migrants as they
interact with legal aid organizations and navigate the Chinese judicial system.
Ultimately, this article concludes that migrant access to the formal court system is promising but limited. As Charles Epp has argued, the protection of individual rights is largely a "bottom-up" process, not merely a "top-down" one:
legal mobilization requires a support structure of rights advocacy organizations,
sympathetic government agencies, and eager lawyers capable of strategic and
sustained litigation, not simply constitutional guarantees or an activist judiciary.2 8 Under this formulation, the recent establishment of a support structure of
legal aid for migrants marks a significant stride in China's, or at least Beijing's,
legal development. The mere existence of a substantial network of legal aid
providers in Beijing aiming to redress migrant abuses has the potential to
strengthen the rule of law, deter abuses, and expand the rights of migrants. Yet
there are also substantial impediments that may stunt the growth of this legal
mobilization: for instance, the divergent goals of the various providers, the uneasy mix between government and non-government involvement, and the limited
24 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 7; INSTrrUTIONALIZED EXCLUSION, supra note 4; Mary E. Gallagher,
"Use the Law as Your Weapon!" Institutional Change and Legal Mobilization in China, inENGAGING
THE LAW IN CHINA, supra note 9; Liebman, supra note 8.
25 See Ethan Michelson, Unhooking from the State: Chinese Lawyers in Transition 32-33 (Aug.
2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago), available at http://www.indiana.edu/-emsoc/Dissertation.html (noting that even though there are more lawyers in Beijing than in any other city
and the city's population and level of development calls into question its representativeness, it is a city at
the vanguard of China's legal profession). Indeed, recent efforts on the part of the state and NGOs to
expand legal aid for migrants to other cities seemed to have used the approach of Beijing and other more
developed cities as a template. See, e.g., Hubei Sets Up First Legal Aid Center For Migrant Workers,
CHINA DAILY, Aug. 23, 2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/23/content
368083.htm.
26 See infra Part IV.B.
27 See infra Part V.
28 CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 18-20 (1998). Epp defines legal mobilization as "the process by which individuals make claims about their legal rights and pursue lawsuits to defend or develop those rights." Id. at 18.

172

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 4, Issue 2

Migrant Access to Civil Justice in Beijing

areas of the law eligible for legal redress. In addition, the sheer size of the migrant population in Beijing and its variety of needs require an expansion of the
funding and scope of legal aid to protect migrant rights more fully.
This article is comprised of seven parts. Part II briefly describes the history of
urban migration in China and efforts to extend legal services to migrants. Part III
gives an introduction to the methodology underlying our data. Part IV describes
the various gatekeepers-governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental-that provide legal services for migrants in Beijing. Part V examines the
relationships between these gatekeepers and how their differing goals may limit
their effectiveness. Part VI draws upon an in-depth case study to illustrate these
points. Part VII concludes that the substantial involvement and cooperation of
various actors in providing court access to Beijing's migrant community may
provide migrants with a key weapon in the arsenal of rights, but also may raise
troubling questions.
II.

The History of Migrant Laborers and Court Access in Beijing

China's migrant workers-known variously as liudong renkou ("floating population"), nongmin ("peasants"), or simply mingong ("workers")-huddle at the
fringes of China's increasingly urban society. 29 Their status is largely a function
of government policy. Beginning in the 1950s, the Chinese government rigidly
controlled internal migration through a system of registering its citizens in their
residences called the hukou system. 30 Although economic changes and reforms
have relaxed and decentralized some of the hukou controls, the system still prevents low-income rural migrants from receiving essential public services. The
state's policy has clearly favored affluent urban centers over poorer
rural areas
31
and serves as a major tool in upholding the one-party regime.
A.

A Brief History of the Hukou System

Though it has analogues in Chinese history, the current form of the household
regulation system arose in response to an influx of rural peasants in the early
years of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). 32 From 1949 to 1957, approxi29 See generally SOLINGER, supra note I (contending that migrants' status in Chinese society as
nomadic and inferior non-citizens runs counter to the very idea of Chinese citizenship). Cf. ZHANG,
supra note 3 (tracing migrants' establishment of social networks and power bases and how they have
directly challenged state control).
30 See generally WANG, supra note 2; Kahn, supra note 2 (reporting the trial abandonment of the
hukou system in several provinces).
31 See Statement of Prof. Fei-Ling Wang, Roundtable Before the Cong.-Executive Comm. on China,
109th Cong. 1, 3 (Sept. 2, 2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
=109_house.hearings&docid=F:24019.pdf.
32 The household registration system and the regulation of internal migration as a means of social
control has a long history in China, extending back to the ban on Han Chinese migration to Manchuria
during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). See WANG, supra note 2, at 32-43 (examining the historical
roots of the hukou system); Frank N. Pieke, Introduction: Chinese MigrationsCompared, in INTERNAL
AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES 1, I (Frank N. Pieke & Hein Mallee eds.,
1999) (noting the historical precedent of strict migration controls in China and its uniquely Chinese
characteristics).
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mately twenty-six million peasants migrated to China's cities to seek jobs in the
country's newly established industries. 33 Concerned that a massive influx of rural migrants would decrease social stability and undermine its Soviet-style economic plan, the government established a national household registration system
in 1958 to segregate urban from rural Chinese. 34 From 1958 until the late 1970s,
no resident could legally move from where they were registered without first
presenting documents to the local authorities and obtaining official approval-a
permission that was rarely granted. 35 Since all services were tied to where the
household was registered, migrants without a residency permit in a city were
36
denied basic services such as housing, education, employment, and even food.
migration within China was esThis policy was highly effective-rural-to-urban
37
sentially halted until the late 1970s.
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, market reforms unleashed a surge in
rural-urban migration as rural residents flocked to the cities in search of better
opportunities. 38 The decollectivization of rural agricultural communes created a
surplus of rural laborers, and new markets from which goods and services could
be purchased freed rural peasants to move in search of work. The state's establishment of Special Economic Zones and its focus on urban development also
instigated rural-to-urban migration. As the economic disparity between the coun33 See R.J.R. KIRKBY, URBANIZATION IN CHINA:

TOWN AND COUNTRY IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY

22 (1985); see also SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that the early 1950s were a time of relatively
unrestricted movement in China).
34 See Hukou dengji tiaoli [Regulations on Hukou] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Jan. 9,
1958) (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-01/06/content_2423627.htm (establishing a nationwide hukou system). The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's highest legislative body. Because the NPC meets only once a year, most law-making is promulgated by the Standing
Committee, but the executive branch of PRC, headed by the State Council, also has the power to enact
regulations and administrative measures. At the provincial level, people's congresses may also enact a
wide range of local regulations, but laws and regulations at the national level trump local regulations if
they are inconsistent.
35 See Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants, supra note 4, at 181; ZHANG, supra note 3, at 26-27; Kahn,
supra note 2. As Professor Fei-Ling Wang notes: "Chinese citizens need their hukou documentation for
education, marriage, passports, travel, employment, business licenses, and even to open an account for a
public utility .... " WANG, supra note 2, at 67. Every household in China, even today, is given one of
two designations: rural or urban. This designation is reflected on their national identity card.
36 See Guanyu shizheng liangshi dingliang gongying zhanxin banfa de mingling [Temporary Measures on Rationing Food Supply] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 25, 1955) (P.R.C.), available
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/28/content2388644.htm (rationing food based on person's
hukou status); see also WANG, supra note 2, at 49-50.
37 See WANG, supra note 2, at 47-48 (noting that with the exception of the beginning of the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76) and for those seeking college education or military training, migration essentially
halted until 1978). This policy was not only enforced by government officials, but also by neighborhood
watchers, typically older women wearing red armbands, who would question passersby who looked out
of place. See Ma, supra note 11, at 66.
38 See generally SOLINGER, supra note 1. The degree to which market forces versus state policies
have contributed to rural-urban migration is a matter of debate. Compare SOLINGER, supra note 1, at
150-53 (maintaining that the hukou system and bureaucratic policies served as an impediment to market
forces pushing for migration) with Lei Guang, The State Connection in China'sRural-UrbanMigration,
39 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 354, 355-56 (2005) (highlighting that China's internal migration has been
facilitated by the state); see also Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban
Migration: Processes and Changes, 160 CHINA Q. 818, 819 (1999) (stating that the hukou system is not
primarily designed to block migration, but to serve multiple state interests).
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tryside and the cities widened, the lure of higher-paying jobs in the cities and
special economic zones proved irresistible to many rural peasants.
In response to these market forces, China began to relax some of the hukou
restrictions on population mobility. 39 Perhaps in recognition that migration
would spur economic development by providing abundant cheap labor, as well as
alleviate the problem of unemployment in the countryside, the central government in 1985 began to authorize temporary urban residency permits for those
with legitimate business or employment reasons for migrating. 40 Further reforms
since the 1990s have greatly increased the mobility of selected groups of rural
hukou holders. Currently, rural hukou holders who have a stable source of income and reside in a small city or town can apply for an urban hukou after two
4
years. 1
However, these legal means of migrating have been limited mainly to the
wealthy or educated and have not yet been extended to large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. 42 In addition, at the same time that the government loosened
the hukou shackles for some people, it granted local officials substantial discretion to exclude certain groups called the zhongdian renkou or "targeted people. ' ' 4 3 Those targeted include people local governments deem to pose a threat to
urban stability, such as criminals, political subversives, and those with violent
tendencies. 44 Because migrants are often linked to the rise in urban crime and
social instability, local officials also interpret "targeted people" as applying45to
poor, rural migrants and can sometimes deny them legal entry into the city.
Even apart from legal procedures, however, millions of poor, rural Chinese
have migrated to cities without any formal registration. By 2003, government
estimates placed the number of rural migrants in China's urban areas at 140 milmigrants, constilion. 46 In Beijing alone, there are currently over three million
47
tuting roughly one-quarter of the city's total population.
39 The legal foundations of the hukou system are not entirely clear; it has been governed mostly by
internal decrees and directives, and its operations are still cloaked with secrecy. See WANG, supra note 2,
at 28.
40 See Provisional Regulations on the Hukou Management of Temporary Urban Residents (promulgated July 13, 1985); Regulation on Resident's Personal Identification in the People's Republic of China
(promulgated September 6, 1985); see also Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants, supra note 4, at 183.
41 See Statement of Prof. Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 31, at 30. Recently, under pressure, the government has deepened some of the hukou reforms. See Kahn, supra note 2. Although this has been erroneously reported in the Western press as the end of the hukou, social services in urban areas are still largely
conditioned on hukou status. See CECC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 116 & n.21.
42 See WANG, supra note 2, at 54.

43 See id. at 107-11.
44 See id. at 109.

45 See id. at 110. The government has had some difficulty actually putting this system into practice;
because of their mobility, many migrants are able to elude control and surveillance by the authorities. Id.
46 China's Floating Population Tops 140 Million, supra note 1.
47 BEIJING STATISTIC BUREAU, BEIJING SHI TONGJuU 2003 NIAN GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI FAZHAN
TONGJI GONGBAO [2003 National Economic and Social Development Statistical Report] (Feb. 12, 2004),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/reldetail.jsp?docid= 14155 1.
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B.

Overview of Beijing's Migrant Population

The migrant population in Beijing is far from monolithic. Migrants come
from various corners of China and speak different dialects-for some, Mandarin,
the lingua franca of China, is a "foreign" language. Some migrants settle in
48
neighborhoods within Beijing with other migrants from their same province,
while other migrants float from worksite to worksite. Still others, after a few
years, migrate back to their home villages.
Migrant occupations divide along gender lines. An estimated 60% of migrants
in Beijing are males, 4 9of whom at least 300,000 work in the construction jobs
that have reshaped the city's skyline overnight. 50 Female migrants flock to factory jobs or the service sector, working as shopkeepers and nannies for the nascent middle and upper classes. 5 1 Migrants are also young-their average age is
28.6 years old. 52 Migrants working in factories or on construction grounds usually live in squalid camps at their worksites and work marathon shifts to keep
construction or production running for twenty-four hours a day. 53 Migrants
working in the service industry seem to have a slightly easier time: they are
required to maintain a clean demeanor and are allowed to work fewer hours per
54
week.
Despite their diversity, migrants in Beijing are united in one respect-they
lack urban hukou or even temporary residency permits and therefore are not afforded many of the rights and services received by hukou-holding locals. Because migrants are seen as draining the resources of local governments and as a
source of social ills and competition for jobs and living space, Beijing has erected
a variety of discriminatory measures against them. 55 The city has limited essen56
tial services-such as education, health, and even jobs-to local residents only.
48 Perhaps the most famous, and certainly the most studied, is "Zhejiang Village," a portion of southern Beijing that specializes in garment production and whose residents hail from Zhejiang province. See
SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 231-34, 249-56; Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaigns,supra note 10, at
124-26.
49 See SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 21.
50 See generally Victor Yuan & Xin Wong, Migrant Construction Teams in Beijing, in INTERNAL
AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, supra note 32, at 103.
ON IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1999); C. Cindy
51 See generally DELIA DAVIN, INTERNAL MIGRIm
Fan, The State, the Migrant Labor Regime, and Maiden Workers in China, 23 POL. GEOG. 283 (2004).
52 State Council Survey Shows 200 Million Rural Labourers on the Move, CHINA LABOUR BULL.,
Apr. 19, 2006, available at http://www.clb.org.hk/public/contents/37615.
53 See Yuan & Wong, supra note 50, at 104 (characterizing migrant construction jobs as the hardest
and most tiring of all migrant occupations).
54 See generally Pun Ngai, Becoming Dagongmei [Laboring Sisters]: The Politics of Identity and
Difference in Reform China, 42 CHINA J. 1 (1999) (examining the working lives of female factory workers and the discrimination they face).
55 This may be due to the fact that three levels of government-the central government, the rural
governments, and the host governments-have overlapping jurisdiction over migrants. Their policies in
response to migration vary widely. See generally Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants, supra note 4. Rural
officials generally encourage migration, urban governments discourage it, and the central government is
somewhere in between. Id.
56 For instance, for years Beijing restricted migrants from engaging in certain occupations, such as
taxi driving. Beijing shi waidi laijing wugong jingshang renyuan guanli tiaoli [Ordinance for the Man-
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Education of migrant children, in particular, is provided on an unequal basis. 57
The Beijing government also periodically engages in law enforcement campaigns
against migrants to combat crime and restore social order. 58 Indeed, as recently
as 2000, Beijing authorities leveled
entire migrant villages in a brazen effort to
"control" the migrant population. 59 There even have been rumblings that the
Beijing authorities may again expel large numbers of migrants to "clean up" the
60
city in advance of the 2008 Olympics.
C.

Migrants and Dispute Resolution

Although migrants are subject to a wide variety of injustices and discriminatory treatment, they have legal recourse to address only a small portion. This is
due in part to the limitations of Chinese law; many legal protections, such as the
country's labor laws, are unenforced. 6 1 But this is also due in part to the restrictions of legal aid. For instance, government-sponsored legal aid limits its coverage to claims involving state compensation, government benefits, support
payments, labor compensation, and other undefined measures in the public interest. 62 Thus, the injustices that migrants bring to legal aid, and occasionally to
court, tend to fall into three categories: non-payment of wages, workplace accidents, and, to a far lesser extent, sexual harassment.
agement of Beijing's Migrant Workers] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Beijing Municipal People's Cong., Apr. 14, 1995, revised 1997, repealed Mar. 25, 2005), available at http://www.law-lib.com/
law/law-view.asp?id=25833. The bulk of these restrictions were ostensibly repealed in 2005. See Beijing quxiao dui waidi laijing wugong jingshang renyuan de xianzhixing guiding [Beijing to Abolish its

Restrictive Provisions on Migrant Workers], XINHUANET, Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/25/content_2742633.htm.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests
that many less obvious forms of discrimination against migrants still remain in Beijing, as in other cities
in China. See Jim Yardley, A Ban Tells of Wealth and Its Discontents, N.Y. TIMF.s, Jan. 15, 2007, at A4

(reporting that Guangzhou's soon-to-be instated ban on motorcycles will disproportionately affect the
mobility and quality of life of its migrant workers).
57 Despite a revised national Compulsory Education Law, which requires migrant children to be

enrolled in local state-run schools, Beijing requires five certificates-a temporary residence permit, work
permit, proof of residence, certificate from the place of origin, and household registration booklet-in
order to attend local, state-run schools. Many migrants lack this documentation, not to mention the
means to afford substantial local school fees. They therefore have established their own schools in Beijing to fill the void. See Prepared Statement of Chlod Froissart, Roundtable Before the Cong.-Executive

Comm. on China, 109th Cong. (2005). Because these schools are unregistered and technically illegal,
they are subject to arbitrary closure by the authorities. See Beijing Closes Schools for Migrant Children
in Pre-Olympic Clean-up, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sept. 25, 2006, available at http://www.hrw.org/

english/docs/2006/09/26/chinal4263.htm.
58

See generally Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaigns, supra note 10.

59 See generally ZHANG, supra note 3 (tracing the destruction and reconstruction of a migrant enclave
in Beijing).
60 See Beijing Closes Schools for Migrant Children, supra note 57.
61 For this reason, even a revised draft of China's labor law that expands legal protections and the
role of labor unions may do little to protect migrants, who tend to work illegally at smaller businesses.
See David Barboza, China Drafts Law to Empower Unions and End Labor Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2006.
62 Fald yuanzhu tiaoli [Regulations on Legal Aid] (promulgated July 16, 2003, effective Sept. 1,
2003), art. 10, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLawslResidencySocWelfare/regsLegalAid.
php.
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Aware that migrants lack sophisticated legal knowledge and are desperate for
money to support family members left behind in their hometown villages, employers take advantage of a contract law that, up until recently, required written
evidence of employment. 63 Employers deliberately refused to sign an employment contract and later used this as an excuse to refuse to deny migrant employees their wages. 64 In fact, some studies suggest half of all migrants have been
unpaid for work. 65 Migrants also tend to work in dangerous industries with lax
safety codes, leading to gruesome workplace accidents. 66 Migrant women face
the additional problem of sexual harassment from bosses and co-workers and are
67
often fired if they become pregnant.
The vast majority of disputes involving China's migrants end up in non-formal
channels. 68 Migrants frequently tolerate abuse, or pursue informal methods of
dispute resolution such as mediation, arbitration, or petitioning government officials directly for redress-a process called xinfang or "letters and visits. ''6 9 But
mediation and arbitration function best when there is some degree of similar social status, which is rarely the case for civil actions involving migrants. Likewise, petitioning a government official through an office dedicated to such
requests, which can either supplement or replace a formal lawsuit, hinges on the
subjective receptiveness of an official who may have little to gain from resolving

63 See Wang Ye, Projects to Further Protect Migrant Workers, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 10, 2006, at 3,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/10/content_530649.htm
(quoting the

vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions as saying his organization "will strive to
ensure 90 per cent of migrant workers have a labour contract with their employers by 2008"). Although
judges are no longer supposed to bar labor disputes where there was no written contract, in reality the
substantial discretion that judges are granted may allow many of them to do so. See generally Margaret
Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 581
(1999).

64 Many migrants, used to more communal and informal social arrangements in their villages, do not
understand the importance of written contracts or official work relationships.
65

See

BEIJING QINGSHAONIAN FALO YUANZHU YU YANJIU ZHONGXIN ZHIZUO [BEIJING CHILDREN'S

LEGAL AID AND RESEARCH CENTER],

GAO [REPORT:

ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WEIQUAN CHENGBEN:

THE IMPACT OF MIGRANTS EXERCISING THEIR RIGHTS]

1

(2005)

DIAOCHA BAO-

(on file with authors)

(noting that 48% of migrants in Beijing have reported being unpaid for work).
66 See Fu Jing, Migrant Workers to Get Injury Insurance, CHINA DAILY, July 26, 2004, at 1, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/26/content_351589.htm (noting that workplace accidents take 100,000 lives each year, many of them migrants).
67 See ZHANG YE,ASIA FOUND., MIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS AND THE EMERGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN

CHINA 4-6 (2001), available at http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/ZhangYe.BSR.pdf (highlighting the

unique problems facing migrant women workers).
68 See CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 72. This is also true within Beijing's general
population. See Ethan Michelson, How Much Does Law Matter in Beijing? Prepared Statement for Law

and Society Association Annual Meeting, at 21 (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.indiana.edu/
-emsoc/Publications/MichelsonHowMuchDoesLawMatter.PDF.
69 See CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 72-75; See also Isabelle Thireau & Hua
Linshan, One Law, Two Interpretations: Mobilizing the Labor Law in Arbitration Committees in Letters

and Visits Offices, in ENGAGING

THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 84

(Neil J. Diamant et al., eds., 2005) (comparing workers' expressions of injustice in xinfang administrative
bureaus and arbitration committees).
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the dispute. Indeed, some estimates place the rate of response at 0.2%.70 Protests, another age-old form of addressing injustice, can occasionally be successful
but carry great risks for their participants, who may face retribution. 7' Because
of the fickle and dangerous nature of these methods, it is perhaps not surprising
that China's poorer citizens and their advocates have increasingly turned to the
courts for redress.
Migrants' use of the court system, though, is predicated on legal aid. In general, migrants are significantly poorer than the average urban resident and cannot
pay for legal services provided by registered lawyers. Until the turn of the century, however, many cities barred migrants without temporary residency permits
from using city-sponsored legal aid, preferring to earmark their aid for local residents instead.7 2 As early as 1996, the central government enacted a Lawyers
Law that imposed obligations on registered lawyers to engage in pro bono representation. 73 The law, however, did not directly address migrants, and local officials often did not extend legal aid to non-residents. Although Beijing's migrants
occasionally were represented by nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs")
74
prior to 2000, few chose to seek legal aid for a variety of reasons.
Beginning in 2001, however, several developments made it easier for migrants
to bring their cases to court and focused public attention on migrant legal rights.
A 2001 Chinese Supreme Court decision clarified the country's Labor Law, making it easier for migrants engaged in labor disputes to file suit.75 Two years later,
in 2003, the death of a young migrant arrested in Guangzhou for failing to produce a temporary residency permit triggered national attention on the plight of
migrants and led to a reevaluation of the system of repatriating
"urban vagrants
76
and beggars" (shourong qiansong) to their home villages.
70 Zhao Ling, Guonei shoufeng xinfang baogao huo gaoceng zhongshi [The First Report on Xinfang
Receives High-Level Attention], NANFANG ZHOUMO [Southern Weekend], Nov. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20041104/xw/szxw 1/200411040012.asp.
71 See generally ELIZABETH J. PERRY, CHALLENGING THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN: SOCIAL PROTEST
AND STATE POWER IN CHINA (2002). Increasingly, appealing to the Chinese media has been an effective
accompaniment to any of these methods of seeking redress. See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005) (exploring
several ways in which the Chinese media influences the courts).
72 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 244-45 (noting that as of 1999, regulations in many Chinese cities
stated that legal aid is available only to local residents or to those with temporary residency permits); see
also Choate, supra note 8, at 20.
73 Lushi fa [Lawyers Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., May 15,
1996, effective Jan. I, 1997), availableat http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/moj/lsgzgzzds/2003-03/19/content
_19544.htm.
74 For example, in 1995 Beijing established a migrant worker service center designed to assist in
resolving labor disputes between migrant workers and management. See SOLINGER, supra note 1, at 93.
75 See Chinese Supreme Court Guiding Principle (Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://law.chinalaw
info.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=Chl&Gid=35573. What constitutes a "labor dispute," however, is narrowly defined under Chinese law, so the effect of this pronouncement was not as far-reaching
as it appears. See Ho, supra note 7, at 41 (noting that the legal protections of the 1995 Labor Law do not
apply to temporary workers and contractors, many of whom are migrants).
76 See Liebman, supra note 71, at 82-89; Zhu Lijiang, The Hukou System and the People's Republic
of China: A Critical Appraisal under International Standards of Internal Movement and Residence, 2
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 519, 548-50 (2003). Sun Zhigang was a 27-year old graphic designer originally
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Also in 2003, the government under new Premier Hu Jintao adopted national
Legal Aid Regulations. These regulations implicitly extended legal aid to migrant workers; Article 6 states that applicants seeking legal aid can obtain a statement proving economic need either from the authorities in their place of hukou
registration or their actual place of residence. 7 7 The national Legal Aid Regulations also explicitly state that legal aid is the responsibility of the state, but at the
same time, invites NGOs to supplement state-sponsored legal aid, a stance that
came as a surprise. 7 8 Despite the government's rosy pronouncements, however,
legal aid remains chronically
underfunded at the local level and often fails to
79
reach those in need.
Three main obstacles often prevent migrants from filing lawsuits even apart
from the need for free legal services. First, the cost for bringing a lawsuit (filing
fees, gathering evidence, etc.) is too high for migrants in contrast to the small
amounts of recovery. Secondly, migrants rarely have a basic awareness of their
rights nor are they familiar with court process. Finally, the Chinese legal system
does not make it easy. At the time of the interview, there were over 900 national
laws and regulations governing labor, and local provinces generally have their
own and often contradictory labor laws. For example, migrants often do not
inquire about legal actions-or are even made aware of actionable transgressions-until long after the migrants can legally state a claim.
Migrants' use of courts coincides with the central government's push to channel politically acceptable disputes through its legal institutions. 80 Admittedly, the
government's efforts to establish a rule of law are partially motivated by a desire
for social control-placing disputes in the courts takes them out of the streets
where they may foment social unrest. But that does not necessarily mean that
migrant cases lack any social impact. As the rise in cases brought by migrants
demonstrates, even the establishment of a structure of legal aid can have some
impact on migrants' legal rights.

from Hubei province. Id. at 548 n. 113. After being arrested on the street for not carrying his temporary
residency card, he was beaten to death by fellow inmates at a detention center. Id. The case prompted a
media outcry and massive protests. Id. Several legal scholars petitioned the government to revise its
administrative detention policy for migrants and the poor, and shortly thereafter the government responded. Id. at 549 n. 115, 550.
77 Faloi yuanzhu tiaoli [Regulations on Legal Aid] (promulgated July 16, 2003, effective September
1, 2003), art. 10, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/ResidencySocWelfare/regsLegal
Aid.php.
78 See Prepared Statement of Benjamin L. Liebman, Roundtable Before the Cong.-Executive Comm.
on China, 108th Cong. 7, 24 (2004) (noting that prior to 2003 there was a fear that the government would
channel all legal aid through the Ministry of Justice).
79 See CECC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 135.
80 For instance, the Ministry of Justice has advocated a "popularization of the law," or pufa, as a

means to improve citizens' familiarity with legal rights and institutions. See P.R.C. Ministry of Justice,
Law Popularization Home Page, http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/english/LawPopularization/LawPopularizationl.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (highlighting the government's efforts at popularizing the law).
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III. Methodology
In August 2005, we interviewed Beijing legal aid organizations from six different categories of providers. 8 1 These legal aid organizations varied in many
respects, including their financial support from the city, funding levels from
NGOs, goals, and legal expertise. In most cases, we interviewed multiple members of each organization. When applicable, these interviews included the
groups' main decision-makers as well as the direct service providers. Interviews
were conducted at the legal aid office with the assurance of anonymity for all
interview subjects. In several instances, the publications or files each organization produced supplemented our interviews. Additional supplemental documents
included copies of case files, advocacy papers, and publications given directly to
migrants.
Additionally, to understand migrants' perception of legal aid providers and
migrant labor law, we interviewed a pair of migrant plaintiffs who had attempted
to gain assistance from several legal aid providers, as they pursued an all-toocommon nonpayment action against a former employer.8 2 Substantively, our interviews focused on what legal aid organizations perceived to be the goals of
their organizations, and how they functioned individually and with each other.
IV.

Legal Aid Gatekeepers and Migrants

Our legal aid providers identified several resources necessary to service migrants' legal aid needs. Our interviews also highlighted the procedures and challenges faced by these legal aid providers and the different manner used to
achieve their legal aid goals.
A.

Overview of Migrant Legal Aid Providers' Resources

We interviewed six different forms of legal aid providers working with Beijing's migrant population. The six providers span a spectrum in the recognition
they receive from local and national governments and the types of legal aid services they provide migrants. 83 All of them work with the migrant population but
vary in their strategies and goals because of their particular constraints. These
constraints included prosaic concerns, such as limited financial resources, legal
training, access to a dedicated workforce, access to migrants, and status and reputation. An individual provider's lack of a certain resource often drives them to
establish relationships with other providers in hopes of furthering their own or81 Interviews were conducted at the legal aid providers' worksites with the assurance of anonymity
for all interview subjects. In most cases, we interviewed multiple legal aid organizations (and multiple
members of these organizations) within each category. For the purpose of this article, we have selected
one organization from each category which best demonstrates the themes we observed across all examples of each category.
82 See infra Part V.A.
83 The variety of legal aid organizations is perhaps surprising. Prior to 2003, some predicted that the
government, through the Ministry of Justice, would dominate legal aid and snuff out private providers.
See Prepared Statement of Liebman, supra note 78, at 24 (noting that prior to 2003 there was a fear that
the government would channel all legal aid through the Ministry of Justice).
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ganization's goals. A brief overview of the resources identified as invaluable by
the .providers follows. They include financial resources, trained and dedicated
workforce, access to migrant communities, and reputation.
1. FinancialResources
Perhaps the most ubiquitous challenges faced by migrant legal aid organizations are limited resources and funding. Clearly, a well-funded organization is
potentially better able to offer services for migrants. Since the financial costs
associated with filing cases are high for migrants and even the rare victorious
case often fails to result in attorney fees, organizations hoping to represent migrants must be ready to do so at a monetary loss. At present, most legal aid
organizations still rely on government support, most notably from the provincial
government. Thus, legal aid varies greatly from province to province. 84 Pro
bono services from bar associations are only in its infancy; domestic private contributions to legal assistance programs are even rarer. By and large, legal assistance programs are found in law school clinics and some are externally funded by
foreign organizations.
2.

Legal Training

Given the developing nature of migrant advocacy, it has become important for
organizations to improve their legal training and knowledge by familiarizing
themselves with both substantive laws relating to migrant rights and the unique
means courts and administrative bureaus address migrant-related cases. Because
providers working with migrants enter legal aid with diverse backgrounds, individual providers may have little, if any, formal legal training. Even for welltrained attorneys, relevant statutes are numerous and may include various national and city-wide statutes in multiple areas of law. 85 The unique issues migrants face in the judicial process can range from lack of evidence to difficulty in
communications as differences in dialect and culture test the patience of both
lawyers and clients. Representing migrants often becomes an exercise in
busywork such as unearthing evidence, filling endless forms, and navigating a
large bureaucratic system on behalf of clients. For the lawyer, working with a
migrant population means training not only in law, but also in cultural and social
sensitivity.
Access to a Dedicated Workforce

3.

Limited legal training may circumscribe such providers' impact or efficiency
within the Chinese legal system. Since private lawyers in business practices can
be more readily profitable, legal aid organizations struggle to identify, utilize,
and retain a properly trained workforce. Currently, few lawyers or organizations
84 See generally Liebman, supra note 8.
85 For example, there are 963 national statutes regarding labor law, one of multiple areas of national

laws (not to mention city- or province-specific laws) that may be relevant in bringing a migrant action.
See Advocacy Attorneys, supra note 1.
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profit from migrant representation and fewer lawyers remain in migrant practice
for long. 6 Alternately, nonlawyer advocates may be more dedicated to migrant
representation and advocacy, especially if they have personal connections with
the migrant population.
4.

Access to Migrant Clients

Even with an experienced workforce, outreach to migrants is problematic. Migrants often distrust seemingly official institutions. Much like their relationships
with courts and bureaus, legal aid organizations must establish guanxi with migrants or migrant leaders to earn their trust. 87 Since many of the providers are
Beijing residents, reaching these migrants may also require overcoming dialect
and cultural differences. Many migrants still retain strong ties to their home villages and may only trust lawyers originally from their home provinces.
5.

Status and Reputation

Finally, an organization's reputation often proves to be a nearly indispensable
asset. Traditionally, establishing strong guanxi between attorneys and judges is
an important element of litigation. In civil cases, it was common practice for
attorneys litigating a civil suit to treat the presiding judge to dinner and drinks
prior to the trial-all on the client's tab-to argue the merits of the case and
foster a positive personal relationship with the judge. 88 In a migrant case, where
the migrant clients cannot afford to establish such relationships with judges, an
organization's existing relationship with officials is an even more significant asset to migrant representation.
Each of these resources can limit and define an organization's actual work,
apart from its stated goals. Exploring the organization's full ambit of influence
would require not only an examination of its professed aims but also a probing of
the five resources listed above.
B.

Migrant Legal Aid Providers

Migrant legal aid providers can be divided generally into six categories-government-sponsored, individual practictioners, advocacy law firms, universitysponsored clinics, community-based organizations, and migrant-sponsored
initiatives.
86 See Michelson, supra note 19, at 19 (observing that Zhou Litai, the famed lawyer for migrant
industrial workers, was engaged in litigation against his former clients for failing to pay his attorney's

fees).
87 Guanxi refers to a vaguely Confucian concept of relationships, social order, and the brokering of
favors. The connection between the Chinese concept of guanxi, and formal law has been examined in the
past. See Ethan Michelson, Chinese Lawyers: Guanxi as a Substitute for Rights, Paper Presented at
Human Rights in China: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, at University of Chicago, Apr. 19, 2003.
88 See Interview with Chinese law professor and practitioner who has represented migrants, in Boston
(Mar. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Chinese Law Professor].
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Government-Sponsored Legal Aid Centers for Migrants89

1.

The Chinese government has fostered the development of government-sponsored legal aid since the mid-1990s, when several legal aid centers were opened
in cities across the country. 90 In 1994, Beijing began to require local lawyers to
engage in legal aid work and three years later, Beijing established a centralized
legal aid center to coordinate these efforts. 9 ' Migrant eligibility for governmentsponsored legal aid in Beijing, however, was not clear-cut until the 2003 law on
legal aid. 92 Since then, migrant usage of the government legal aid offices has
increased markedly; by 2005, migrants constituted 80% of the cases one Beijing
legal aid office handled. 9 3 This is significant for at least two reasons. First,
many government-sponsored legal aid clinics in other cities tend to ignore migrant issues, choosing instead to focus limited legal aid resources on local residents. 94 In contrast, Beijing's government-sponsored legal aid system can be
seen as comparatively supportive of migrant issues. Secondly, and more cynically, the government's reason for responding to migrant legal needs may have
less to do with empowering a deprived population or advocating for class equality. 95 Rather, it is designed to instill respect for the law, or more specifically, to
96
maintain social control. This goal informs how they respond to migrant cases.
We visited a Beijing government-sponsored legal aid office in a Beijing district to examine how the office screens and processes its cases. Within government-sponsored legal aid, the coordination is elaborate and theoretically
hierarchical. The district legal aid center, for instance, operates as a district office under the purview of Beijing's central legal aid office. 97 However, increasingly, the district legal aid office's day-to-day interactions and services for
migrant workers must take place independent of centralized supervision or assis89 Interview with Director of Government Sponsored Legal Aid Office, in Beijing (Aug. 18-19,
2005) [hereinafter Director Interview]. Unless otherwise noted, all information in Part IV.B.I derives
from this interview.
90 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 219-20 (reporting that the 1994 draft of the Lawyer's Law included
a provision stating that the government would provide legal aid to assist those unable to afford legal

fees).
91 Beijing's legal aid center traditionally assigns attorneys to assist indigent clients who qualify for
aid. Id. at 229.
92 Cf Shanghai Municipality Decisions on Legal Aid [Shanghai shi falib yuanzhu ruogan guiding],
art. 5 (May 9, 2005), available at http://www.fengcn.cn/assistance/0653022350588.html (finally clarifying in 2005 that migrant workers were eligible for government-sponsored legal aid for labor disputes,
occupational injuries, and domestic violence).
93 A large number of these, however, may have been criminal cases. See sources cited supra note II.
While our interview subject anecdotally noted that this represented a substantial increase in the percentage of serviced migrant workers, she also stated that her office did not possess accurate records of aid
recipients prior to 2003.
94 See sources cited supra note 13.
95 See infra Part V.
96

See infra Part V.A.

In fact, the director of the district office only consented to our interview after learning that the
Beijing office had provided us with an interview. The director also asked several questions about the
content of our interview with the Beijing office before her own interview. See Director Interview, supra
97

note 89.
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tance. In part, this is because of the sheer distances between offices, and migrants' inability to reach more distant central legal aid offices. 98 As a result,
district legal aid offices working with migrant workers increasingly function selfsufficiently in order to provide even minimal services. In addition to managing
their own resources, local offices establish their own policies regarding case intake and service procedures and develop relationships with local alternative legal
services.
To determine whether a case rises to the level of a litigable claim, the citysponsored district legal aid office's performs an intake consultation during which
a case worker or telephone operator responds to a migrant's or migrants' complaints and weighs the case's merits. If an intake worker determines that a particular case is litigable, the case is then farmed out to local attorneys to fulfill their
mandated pro bono requirements. The initial screening procedure is often a brief
and perfunctory process. Evidence suggests that only a small percentage of migrant disputes pass this first step. 99 This procedure emphasizes the processing of
high caseloads of relatively simple disputes.
As an initial matter, aid workers determined whether the migrant seeking asI° °
Second,
sistance qualifies for legal aid based on the potential client's income.
the migrant must present a problem that can be remedied under the law-a deter0
mination wholly within the discretion of the caseworker.' ' Finally, aid workers
ask clients to produce documentation to support their claims. This proved to be
the most serious deterrent for migrants seeking assistance.
The need for documentation by aid workers essentially meant that many cases
brought to the office were disposed of without resolution. Most migrant workers
provide employers with anonymous labor and are willing to work without identification or paper documentation. Even in cases where migrants can provide documentation of their employment, it is difficult to demonstrate that the terms of
employment have been violated. Chinese civil trials rely largely on documentary
evidence. In cases where oral testimony is the only available evidence, the lack
of documentation often proves to be an insurmountable barrier to recovery, but
also allows pro bono attorneys to represent clients with more straightforward
claims. This policy of asking for documentation serves government-sponsored
98 Migrants often do not have the time or capital needed to travel across the city via Beijing's convoluted public transportation. In addition, migrants, who generally arrive and operate in the city within a
tong bao, are often afraid to travel individually in the city or even leave their job sites for extended
periods for fear of arousing their employers' suspicions.

99 See 1000 ming waidi mingong zhong, zhenzheng nenggou huode fald yuanzhu de bu zu 3% [Of
1000 Migrant Workers, Less Than Three Percent Are Actually Able to Receive Legal Aid], BEIJING
WANBAO [BEIJING EVENING POST], Jan. 12, 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/
12/content_1271931 .htm.
100 See China Simplifies Legal Aid for Migrant Workers, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, July 27, 2006,
727
_287033.html ("[Government-sponsored] le-gal aid
http://english.people.com.cn/200607/27/eng20060
departments no longer examine the migrant worker's financial status before giving aid").
101 Though the office's director stated that all "relevant personnel" had legal training from reputable
undergraduate law programs, it is unclear whether these graduates include the caseworkers who initially
screen migrant complaints.
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legal aid's dual goals of servicing more cases and encouraging attorneys to comply with their pro bono requirements.
In order to make the best use of limited funding, the district legal aid center
divides migrant complaints into three categories. From most to fewest, these
cases include: 1) laborers who are generally unskilled and often work within
02
their tongbao,1
generally on construction jobs; 2) service workers of various
skill levels, ranging from cleaning ladies to round-the-clock nurses; and 3) selfemployed migrants, who earn a living buying, growing, or making inexpensive
items for sale on city streets.
Resources are allocated in a manner that allows caseworkers to maximize the
number of migrants helped. Since it is common practice for construction developers-often with the help of several layers of middle men' 03-to hire dozens, or
even hundreds of individual workers from a single village or area at a time, a
single settled case in the construction area could provide remedy for many migrants at one time.' 0 4 This is also true in actions involving migrants working in
the service industry, such as female hotel workers, which could allow the provider to service a dozen or more migrants at a time. In comparison, addressing
complaints about smaller employers is likely to only service the needs of an
individual or a family of migrants.
Focusing on civil actions from clients within these categories (with an emphasis on the first two) allows legal aid to focus on cases with straightforward and
non-controversial legal elements such as worker's compensation or breach of
contract and maximizes the number of migrants helped. The first two categories
of cases also provide some semblance of a formal employer-employee contract,
even though producing documentation is a recurring challenge for the legal aid
offices. Few criminal cases are accepted because there is a lack of qualified
attorneys to represent criminal clients. Additionally, though our interview subjects did not explicitly allude to such challenges, bringing criminal actions
against employers could place the government-sponsored legal aid offices in direct opposition to government-sponsored employers investing in local and national development-a showdown the legal aid offices are determined to avoid.
Government legal aid offices, such as the one we interviewed, largely handle
cases that are non-controversial in terms of upsetting established legal and social
norms. Although large numbers of complaints are funneled through their intake
system, these cases are not designed to be "impact" cases that lead to a change in
102 Tongbao is a phrase roughly translated to "fellow countryman." Migrants and legal aid workers,
however, often use this phrase to describe the groups of migrants from the same rural area who enter the
city together and are hired as a group.
103 Migrant workers often refer to these middle-men as xiao laoban, or "minor employers." It was
understood that each level of "employers" took a cut of the fees paid from the original developer. In
some extreme cases, like the case study outlined in Part V, "employers" midway through the chain have
taken the entirety of the moneys paid them and simply disappeared, leaving an ostensible employer with
hundreds of unpaid workers he has never met on an individual basis. See infra Part V.
104 This is possible because of the Chinese rules on class action. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Class
Action Litigation in China, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1998). However, China is increasingly discouraging class actions for fear of the class action's potential to organize dissatisfied citizens and create social
unrest.
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the laws. Rather, the office will take on those cases that will most expeditiously
appease the greatest number of migrants. Its purpose is to calm social dissatisfaction rather than address the root causes of such dissatisfaction.
2.

Individual Attorneys'0 5

Private, registered attorneys in Beijing have traditionally not been receptive to
representing migrant clients. 10 6 The private lawyers who do assist migrants usually do so to satisfy pro bono services or, in the rare case, through contingencyfee type arrangements. Beginning in 1993, Beijing was the first city to require
10 7
To satlawyers to provide legal aid through city-sponsored legal aid offices.
by
them
to
assigned
isfy these requirements, some lawyers represent migrants
08
tried
have
aid
officials
legal
city-sponsored
While
local city legal aid offices.'
to identify attorneys skilled at working migrant cases, pro bono attorneys are
often unfamiliar with legal matters pertinent to migrants. 10 9
At present, there is no systematic training of lawyers for migrant-related
problems. National and local labor and migrant laws are convoluted and often
inconsistent. Pro bono attorneys are often unable to provide complete or even
competent advice to migrant clients, limiting the impact of most pro bono attorneys. For these reasons, in addition to the lack of income for migrant representation, attorneys often dislike working on pro bono cases and represent such clients
with mixed results."10 However, assigning attorneys otherwise uninvolved with
migrants to represent migrant-related cases does raise the legal community's
overall awareness of migrant issues.
There are attorneys who reach out to the migrant communities themselves by
An emerging
establishing relationships with migrant-sponsored initiatives.'
105 Interview with private migrant attorney, in Beijing (Aug. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Private Attorney].
Unless otherwise noted, all information in this Part IV.B.2 derives from this interview.
106 See Michelson, supra note 19, at 15, 21 (noting that Beijing lawyers are unlikely to take on migrant labor cases because of the low fee potential and the lawyers' cultural stereotypes against poor
migrants); see also Michelson, supra note 25, at 210-12 (stating that most Beijing law firms dislike
providing pro bono representation because it reduces their paycheck and the firms therefore tend to shunt
the cases to the most junior lawyers). In recognition of lawyers' entrenched reluctance to assist migrants,
in November 2004, the Ministry of Justice promulgated a directive calling on lawyers to accept more
cases from migrant workers trying to collect back wages and to reduce or waive migrants' legal fees in
doing so. Ministry of Justice, Construction Division, Guanyu wei jiejin jianshe tuoci gongcheng he
yimingong gongzi wenti tigong falii fuwu he fald yuanzhu de tongzhi [Circular on the Provision of Legal
Services and Legal Aid to Resolve the Problem of Construction Fee Arrears in the Construction Industry
and the Problem of Back Wages Owed to Migrant Workers] (Ministry of Justice Document No. 159),
(promulgated Nov. 6, 2004), available at http://www.cin.gov.cn/indus/file/2004120901.htm.
107 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 229.
108 See Director Interview, supra note 89.
109 See id.
110 See generally Michelson, supra note 25.
111 The attorney we interviewed worked in a mergers and acquisition firm and has established a working relationship with such community-based organizations. In this capacity, the attorney has represented
at least three migrant clients brought to his attention by the organization on issues such as workplace
injury and accident liability. Echoing challenges observed by other aid providers, these lawyers found
that representing migrant plaintiffs required large amounts of time to gather evidence often for unsuccessful claims. Given the time demands, lawyers willing to work with migrants must be financially
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handful of registered lawyers have specialized in migrant representation as the
mainstay of their client base. Capitalizing on occasionally generous damage
awards for workplace accidents, these lawyers provide legal services to migrants
on a fee basis. The best known example of such a lawyer is Zhou Litai, who
operates out of Shenzhen and Wuhan.' 12 Zhou has earned national and international renown for his work in 1998 where he won a record amount for a workplace injury. All of the providers we spoke to were aware of Zhou's practice and
expressed surprise that he had created a profitable practice from a migrant client
base. While the impact of his work is difficult to determine, some attorneys have
noted that Zhou's profitable work may encourage more attorneys to represent
migrants in court, or at least demonstrate to employers that courts are willing to
enforce migrant rights and encourage employers to follow labor and migrant

regulations. 113
The motivations for private lawyers working on migrant cases are varied.
When our interview subject was asked why he chose to take migrant cases, he
refused to offer a more specific explanation beyond the fact that he is "interested" in migrant cases and that he "had extra time." When probed further as to
what interested him about migrant work, the attorney noted that his time at his
firm served as a means of making a living and that working with migrants in his
own time is more engaging. This lawyer acknowledged the need of migrants for
more legal representation since city-sponsored legal aid offices, which are funded
by district budgets, often acquiesced to pressure from "local indigents" and focused city-sponsored funds on these populations rather than migrants.
Through his collaboration with the migrant initiative, this attorney has met
five or six other individual attorneys who also represent migrant cases pro bono.
While differing in professional backgrounds and ages, these attorneys all demonstrate extensive interest in migrant issues and recognize the need in working with
migrants. These pro bono lawyers handle few cases, but generally provide some
resolution to disputes. Relationships between these lawyers extend beyond a
shared interest for profitability to a broader concern about social justice.
secure with some flexibility in their schedules. Many pro bono lawyers prefer working with migrant-run
organizations so that the organizations can pre-screen cases and perform many of the more menial and
time-consuming tasks involved. The above sentiments suggest that even attorneys working on straightforward migrant cases require a significant amount of sacrifice and commitment.
112 Mr. Zhou's representation on behalf of migrant workers has been profiled often both within and
beyond China. See, e.g., Shai Oster, Chinese Lawyer Raises Legal Bar, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Aug.
7, 2001, at 6.
113 However, Zhou's much-publicized and successful career success may ironically have at least a
minor adverse impact on practitioners willing to work with migrants. According to Zhou, several migrants have balked on paying his fees after the collection of damages. In 2004, Zhou claimed that 161
former migrant clients had refused to pay his fees, resulting in a loss of five million RMB. Zhou has
gone so far as to bring suits against some of his former clients for nonpayment and defamation, demonizing him to migrants and the popular press alike. The client who received the 1998 settlement has gone on
record to describe Zhou as "a money-hungry ambulance chaser (who) overcharges his clients." This
backlash against Zhou may give many attorneys pause before taking on labor cases involving migrants.
Indeed, none of the providers we interviewed knew of any Beijing-based migrant attorneys with such fee
arrangements. See Yao Ying, Legal 'Savior'fightingfor His Fees, CHINA DAILY, July 5, 2004, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/05/content_345478.htm.
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Indeed, although a few private lawyers have established profitable practices by
bringing migrant suits, far more represent migrants out of a sense of justice or to
fulfill Beijing's pro bono requirements. Resolving individual migrant cases is a
time-consuming process, exacerbated by migrants' unfamiliarity with Beijing
and legal culture. Providers working toward settlement must be both willing and
able to spend large amounts of time or resources for their migrant clients.
Whether pro bono or for profit, these lawyers offer assistance with the deceptively simple intention of settling an individual client's dispute, but ultimately
may reflect a growing sense of public-mindedness among the legal profession.
3.

1
Advocacy Law Firms

14

In the last few years, several Chinese "advocacy law firms" have cropped up
to address the growing needs of China's underserved populations.' '5 We interviewed one Beijing law firm that supplements its representation of migrant clients with scholarship and grassroots legal education for migrants as a form of
advocating for legal change. Established in late 2003 as an offshoot of a firm
representing children, the five-attorney firm provides pro bono consultation and
representation for migrants. Though all of the attorneys graduated from esteemed law schools and passed the bar, they earn a fraction of most private lawyers' income.'16 The firm differentiates its staff from city-sponsored legal aid
providers, which rely largely on individual and often uninterested lawyers fulfilling pro bono obligations. By contrast, these firm lawyers represent a fiercely
committed and idealistic workforce. At the time of the interview, the firm had
hired a new licensed associated who had graduated from one of China's top law
schools and intended to hire five more lawyers within the year.
With a combination of funding from foreign NGOs and Chinese government
grants, the advocacy law firm provides three forms of direct legal services to
migrants at no cost to their clients. They provide outreach legal training sessions,
a nationwide migrant telephone hotline, and formal representation for migrants in
legal proceedings. These lawyers travel to migrant populations to present training sessions or "teaching classes" about basic migrant rights. At the time of the
interview, the firm conducted two migrant classes per month.
None of the lawyers are Beijing natives, a fact that "helped them relate better
to the migrants." The firm fosters relationships with local migrant community
leaders to increase their knowledge of migrants' needs and challenges. The firm
found migrant camps by contacting local government officials. Their reasons for
using government connections are twofold. First, government connections made
finding and organizing migrants more convenient for the lawyers from the firm.
114 Unless otherwise noted, all information in Part IV.B.3 is derived from Advocacy Attorneys, supra

note 1.
115 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 277-78 (noting the growing role of lawyers as activists and advocates for legal change in China).
116 One of the lawyers noted with some bitterness that she earned between two and three thousand
yuan-less than some of her more enterprising migrant clients.
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Secondly, the firm believed that if local officials organized the training sessions,
other governmental bureaus would be less likely to oppose the training sessions.
Adopting strategies used by both city-sponsored legal aid and migrant initiatives, the firm has also established a national telephone hotline, which it uses to
advise migrants facing legal complications. Using the hotline, the firm vastly
increases the number of migrants it can assist, since these calls often last between
three and five minutes. Allied with like-minded legal providers across the country, the firm often refers callers to local providers willing to work with migrants.
Finally, the firm represents migrants from the Beijing area in court for cases
requiring more assistance than could be provided via a telephone consultation.
At the time of the interview, each of the four lawyers was working on an average
of five to ten court cases per month. Half of these cases were for non-payment of
employment and the other half were worker injury cases. Migrant representation
includes courtroom visits, but unlike school- or community-based providers, lawyers from this firm were often able to negotiate and reach settlements directly
with employers. The firm provides all of their services free of charge, even covering their client's travel costs to and from the courts. In some instances, the
expenses accrued by the firm in litigating these cases exceed the value of the
collected damages.
These services, however, only represents a single facet of the firm's practice.
The firm lawyers believe that migrants' main obstacle to receiving fair treatment
under the law is lawmakers' fundamental misunderstanding about migrant populations and the challenges they face. As a result, the firm's primary function is to
serve as an advocacy group, aimed at dispersing migrant-related information and
advocacy to lawmakers. By contrast to government legal aid, perhaps, this law
firm seeks to address the root cause of migrant problems by seeking to change
the established legal norms.
Incorporating conversations with members of the migrant communities, notes
from their hotline consultations, and discussions with migrants they personally
represented, the firm produced periodic reports about migrant difficulties in and
out of court. The reports, which include both original qualitative and quantitative
data, underscore issues facing migrants and advocate for migrant legal reforms.
Multiple reports are distributed to government offices that shape migrant policy.
The firm is uncertain as to the impact of these reports, or if they are even being
read by their intended audiences. To increase the chances that a government
official will read their publications, the firm publishes its reports under its parent
firm's name, which has a better-established reputation among the courts.
As one migrant client stated, the firm operates as more of a "public welfare
policy firm/think tank" than a law firm. Although additional migrant-focused
organizations have been established since 2003, this is the one of the few organization with full-time lawyers and a migrant-centric practice. Since all the lawyers in the firm have passed the bar, the firm feels that they command the respect
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of judges and other practitioners when they work independently. 117 Consequently, the firm focuses its relationships with other organizations as a means of
establishing contact with more migrants. The advocacy law firm thus largely
services migrants through education and advocating for policy and legal changes.
Having strong relationships with other organizations as well as the government
assists this law firm in spreading its influence.
4.

University-Sponsored Clinics1 18

Several universities have funded and run migrant-sponsored legal aid clinics
out of their law departments. 1 9 Following the example of foreign universitysponsored clinics, particularly those based in the United States, these clinics are0
staffed by student attorneys working under the supervision of law professors.12
Many were originally established with funding and support from foreign
NGOs.12 ' Besides direct financial support, NGOs also sponsor foreign legal professionals to work in clinics and establish exchange programs between Chinese
and Western professors in an effort to develop clinical legal education in China.
Several of these school-sponsored initiatives began working with migrants in
2003, after the central government increased its focus on migrant rights. This
shift meant that school clinics, almost all of which are run from state-sponsored
universities, could work with migrant workers without risk of exposing their
sponsoring universities to politically-motivated sanctions.
We interviewed several students and directors at a legal aid clinic located on
the campus of one of Beijing's premier universities. Although the clinic initially
specialized in products liability claims, in 2003 it shifted its focus to labor disputes. The clinic is not exclusively focused on migrants, but its new emphasis on
labor law, coupled with its income eligibility restrictions, has resulted in a majority of migrant clients. Like many of their Western counterparts, Chinese law
schools traditionally do not emphasize lawyering skills, research, or collaboration, making the clinic a singular experience for many of the student volun117 See Chinese Law Professor, supra note 88 (stating that since judicial appointments have traditionally been considered administrative positions, many judges have not received a legal degree and may
sometimes be unfamiliar with substantive areas of law).
118 Interview with students and directors at a worker-focused, university-sponsored clinic, in Beijing
(July 26, 2005, Aug. 20, 2005) [hereinafter University Clinic]. Unless otherwise noted, all information in
Part IV.B.4 is derived from these interviews. We interviewed several students and directors, including
the assistant director who helped establish the clinic's current incarnation.
119 See Kara Abramson, Paradigmsin the Cultivation of China'sFuture Legal Elite: A Case Study of
Legal Education in Western China, 7 AsIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 302, 320 & n.58 (2006) (noting the
recent history of university-run legal clinics). Though universities do offer graduate law degrees, Chinese legal degrees are usually undergraduate programs.
120 This practice of looking to the West for its legal aid models has been criticized. See Michael
William Dowdle, Preserving Indigenous Paradigms in an Age of Globalization: Pragmatic Strategies
for the Development of Clinical Legal Aid in China, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S56, S57 (2000) (arguing
that international development programs focused on China's clinical legal aid have inadvertently suppressed potentially more effective indigenous legal aid models).
121 See June Shih, From the Rule of Man to the Rule of Law, Ford Foundation, Summer 2003, http://
www.fordfound.org/publications/ff-report/view-ff-report-detail.cfm?report-index=43 1.
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teers.' 22 The students we interviewed felt that the clinic helped them develop
their practical legal skills and heighten their sense of public-mindedness.
Students in the legal aid clinic undertake several activities under a professor's
direction. Responsibilities include manning hotlines, securing the intake information of potential clients, accompanying clients to various bureaus, collecting
evidence, and appearing before judges. Because of the university's reputation,
the clinic is often able to convince defendant employers to settle their cases
rather than face off against a well-respected and well-funded institution. Students use the same reputation to gather data and evidence from entities that may
otherwise be unwilling to provide the information to migrants themselves.
At this university legal aid clinic, student volunteers are both undergraduate
and graduate students. Generally, graduate students undertake the more complex
cases and play greater roles in developing case strategies. Since migrant representation is, with rare exceptions, largely unprofitable, it is perhaps unsurprising
that none of the students interviewed expressed interest in working in migrantrelated field following graduation. Nevertheless, the students note that they are
1 23
more aware of migrants' struggles and issues after participating in the clinic.
To further serve the clinic's pedagogical aims, the clinic does not select cases
based on the severity of an individual client's needs or the substantive area of law
a case may address. Instead, cases may be selected to expose a student attorney
to civil procedure, trial techniques, or courtrooms themselves. In some instances,
the clinic will take cases with little chance of succeeding in court. While this
provides migrants with last-ditch assistance in seeking legal redress, it may also
of such false hope may be emotionally
provide them with false hope. The impact
1 24
draining and financially disastrous.
Furthermore, court filing fees and travel costs to and from the clinics also
contribute to the cost of litigation. Migrant workers can risk losing all of their
limited savings to have a day in court. In other instances, the clinic may choose
to represent clients with especially simple or straightforward cases for similar
who may be particularly
pedagogical purposes rather than focusing on migrants
25
needy. The following narrative is illustrative.'
122 Compared to the Socratic method largely adopted by American Law Schools, Chinese law classes
involve very limited student discussion or collaboration, relying mostly on large lecture-format classes
with an emphasis on memorization and recitation. See Chinese Law Professor, supra note 88.
123 One of the lawyers working at the advocacy firm profiled earlier in this section, however, worked
in a different legal clinic at another top-ranked University before joining her current firm. See supra, Part
IV.B.3.
124 For a migrant who is often not working while litigating a case, living within the city is a significant
expense. The cost of living in Beijing is exponentially higher than their rural hometowns. The workers
profiled in Part V stated that the food fees their employers docked from their wages each day could feed
their families for a week in their home province.
125 We interviewed one nineteen-year old student who recounted such a case. The student represented
a thirty-five-year-old migrant surnamed Yen, who served as the spokesperson for eighty-two other migrants from his home province. The student attorney stated that working on the case allowed her to gain
in-court experience and gave her a better understanding of both the legal community and the community
at large. She also credited the clinic with teaching her more compassion and self-reliance, time management skills, and broadening her point of view, traits that the clinic is uniquely positioned to groom within
the law school.
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After the conclusion of a year-long construction engagement, an employer
who had hired Yen and his tongbao claimed that none of the contracts the migrants signed were binding and refused to pay any of the migrants. The migrants
claimed they were owed over 70,000 RMB. As the group's representative, Yen
spent considerable time and effort researching and preparing his case. Yen only
contacted the university-sponsored legal aid clinic after several of his own inand out-of-court attempts to recover the money failed.
Yen's case was much stronger than the vast majority of migrant cases. First,
Yen was able to borrow money during the months he spent researching his case,
collecting evidence, and filing claims. He amassed about 3,000 RMB of debt
while pursuing his case. In addition to allowing him to pay for forms and complaint filing fees, these funds also freed him from several of the practical restraints migrant plaintiffs often face when litigating their cases, including being
able to travel freely during business hours and openly pursuing the legal claims
without concealing these actions from current employers. Additionally, Yen,
who was literate and relatively educated, was also able to consult a relative who
helped him understand the process of filing claims and the types of evidence
needed to support his case. Most importantly, Yen was able to produce evidence
that was highly probative of his relationship with the developer. He had the
uncommon foresight to insist on written documentation proving his relationship
with the developer and the developer was needy enough for immediate workers
to provide it for him. When the validity of this evidence was called into question, Yen was able to collect additional evidence, going so far as to surreptitiously record conversations with the developer's employees to support his
claims.
Due to its straightforward nature and the limited legwork required by the students, this case proved to be ideal for the Tsinghua clinic. Students were able to
work on the legal aspects of the case while Yen conducted the more mundane
aspects of the preparation such as finding and preparing documents or collecting
necessary forms. Individual students were brought on to work with Yen during
specific portions of the trial such as discovery, the trial, attempted collection of
damages, and appeal.
5. Migrant Community-Based Organizations

26

In recent years, community-based organizations have been established by migrant leaders and their local supporters, often with funding from foreign nonprofit organizations. 27 These organizations are created to serve specific segments of the migrant population such as school-aged immigrants, sex workers, or
women. Often created to serve as a de facto resource and community center for
migrant sub-groups, community-based organizations provide legal aid as an extension of their regular services.
126 Interview with assistant director, migrant-run women's organization, in Beijing (Aug. 5, 7, 2005)
[hereinafter Migrant Women's Organization]. Unless otherwise noted, all information in Part IV.B.5 is
derived from these interviews.
127 See Li, supra note 10, at 172-76 (describing several migrant-based legal organizations).
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One of the oldest migrant-established community-based organizations in Beijing focuses on women. Founded in 1996 with financial support and training
from several international non-profit organizations, this organization was one of
the first to target migrant women in Beijing. Initially a project directed by the
publishers of a nationwide advocacy periodical, the office has grown to foster its
own community and identity. At the time of the interview, the organization provided multiple services from its center in addition to its legal work. These services included employment-skills development programs, publication of migrantwritten advocacy papers, literacy programs, regular social events, and suicide
counseling. In the time we spent with this organization, we encountered multiple
foreign scholars working directly with migrants, including an American professor, a Taiwanese sociology PhD candidate, and a British theater professional.
Despite the apparent invasion of foreign scholars, however, the organization remained migrant-run with the underlying goal of raising migrant women's status
in the city and self-respect overall. The assistant director we spoke to was a
female migrant worker, as were the majority of the organization's directors.
The assistant director felt that migrants' greatest difficulty in receiving aid
stems from migrants' limited-if not nonexistent-understanding of their
rights. 128 In providing legal aid, the organization's primary goal is to provide
outreach programs and materials that educate migrants about their rights. Outreach initiatives include flyer and checklist distributions, magazine publications,
and visits to migrant camps. In order to learn about legal rights, staff members
invite individual attorneys to educate the organization's staff on issues such as
evidence gathering, workplace rights, and forming valid contracts. When this
material is in turn presented to invited migrant classes or local migrant communities, staff members, rather than attorneys, present the training and information
sessions. Depending on the migrants' ages and sophistication, the organization
has utilized multiple techniques to teach migrants about their rights. The British
theater professional, for instance, was subsidized by foreign NGOs to use theater
techniques such as role-play simulations and the performance of migrant-created
plays to educate younger women about their rights against sexual harassment.
Pragmatically, the associate director feels that it is important for staff members, themselves migrants, to establish a strong rapport with migrants who are
often reclusive and distrustful of outsiders. Additionally, staff members are wellpositioned to introduce legal concepts and precautions in manners which migrants are more likely to understand. For the organization, however, it is equally
important to empower the migrants they serve. Rather than leaving migrant fates
within the control of agencies run by local professionals or government bodies,
the organizations hope that empowering migrants with an understanding of basic
legal rights will eventually result in a more self-sufficient population. Migrants
who participate in the organizations' training programs are encouraged to share
information they learn with other migrants they live or work with.
128 One teenage migrant who attended the organization's training session stated that prior to attending
the organization's workshops, she was unaware of the concept of sexual harassment.
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In addition to their rights-education outreach efforts, the organization has also
connected some of its members whose rights have been violated with legal practitioners willing to represent migrants in a personal capacity.129 The organization
matches volunteer lawyers with migrant clients. Many of these volunteer attorneys also have ongoing practices of their own, leaving the organization's staff to
conduct the time-consuming tasks related to litigation such as evidence-collection and client interviews. Though these tasks are completed under the volunteer
attorneys' supervision and direction, the assistant director noted that after collaborating with so many attorneys, several of the staff members had become familiar
with basic legal principles and some particular substantive laws relevant to their
members. Staff members have used these experiences to provide rudimentary
legal suggestions to their members. At the time of our interview, the organization's volunteer attorneys had litigated forty cases on behalf of migrants.
Individual Migrant-SponsoredInitiatives

6.

30

At least one migrant has undertaken the daunting task of assisting fellow migrants without the direct support of other non-migrant domestic or foreign entities. A migrant farmer surnamed Chen, who tilled fields near Beijing University
until the University displaced him to make way for faculty housing, has established a hotline for migrants to call to ask for general advice and air grievances.
For migrants with legal issues, Chen serves as a conduit between migrants and
legal advisors sympathetic to migrants. To Chen, however, this service is ancillary to his primary goal of establishing a communal spirit and sense of identity
within the migrant communities across the country.
Chen is a thirty-something year old Hebei native, who migrated in search of
work. He settled in a migrant camp in Beijing's Haidian district, in a one-room
shack he shared with his mother and, later, his father.' 3 1 The area was predominantly filled with migrants; Chen estimated that 4,000 individuals in the area
were Beijing natives while 15,000 were migrants. While he worked and lived
within this migrant village, Chen developed a reputation within his migrant village as a compassionate and mature listener for migrants seeking advice and
opinions. Though Chen claimed that others spoke to him merely because he had
been in Beijing longer than most, several migrants and legal aid providers working with Chen noted that he was a perceptive individual who was also a talented
132
speaker, an admired trait in China.
In January of 2003, Chen decided to nationalize his practice of speaking with
migrants in need. Sponsored initially by the little excess income his parents genThis includes the attorney profiled in Part IV.B.3.
130 Interview with Chen Jun, migrant activist, in Beijing (Aug. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Migrant
Activist]. Unless otherwise noted, all information in Part IV.B.6 is derived from this interview.
131 The shack, made of wooden planks and the original brick wall, was not meant to be a permanent
structure. At the time of the interview, Chen Jun had been informed that the Beijing Government intended to take the land on which he cultivated vegetables and sell it to a local developer within a few
weeks.
132 Perhaps contributing to his reputation as a talented man of words, Chen is also a self-taught poet.
When local media write articles about his hotline, they often include a sample of his original works.
129
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erated from their small garden, Chen took out several advertisements in migrantread newspapers and printed hundreds of flyers with his phone number. Referring
to the migrants across China as his "friends," Chen invited migrants to contact
him on his "hotline" to discuss issues they faced in their adopted cities. To his
knowledge, his is the only migrant-run hotline for migrants in the country. Chen
believes that this allows him to present more consistent points of view and explain issues in ways that migrants can better understand.
Initially, few people called, leaving Chen to spend numerous nonworking
hours in his shack beside the telephone, reading bootlegged books about migrant
issues, the Chinese legal system, and introduction to psychology. By 2004, however, word of Chen's hotline began to spread. Chen answered between 300-400
calls a month at all hours, leading to him eventually rent a small room with a cot.
In the year-and-a-half since Chen established his hotline, he estimates that he has
answered over 5,000 phone calls, most of them since the latter portions of 2004.
Given its popularity, several local
citizens, including several lawyers, began
13 3
sponsoring part of Chen's costs.
The popularity of his hotline generated media coverage across China, which in
turn increased the number of received calls. With the expansion of his hotline,
Chen also developed a small network of local organizations willing to help his
callers. He attended grassroots community building seminars hosted by foreign
NGOs and in time, formed a relationship with individual attorneys working at the
advocacy law firm and other lawyers to provide free legal advice over the phone.
He also established similar relationships with psychiatric experts who were willing to listen and counsel migrants over the phone. Faced with a caller who has
issues beyond his knowledge or ability, Chen would pass the specialist's contact
information to the caller.
However, Chen faced significant resistance in convincing callers to contact
established specialists. In light of this observation, Chen has changed his methodology in answering calls. Rather than only directing his callers to established
legal aid providers, Chen now provides rudimentary legal advice, which he has
learned by consulting basic law books. Chen's advice often focuses on preventative measures. For example, even when callers contact him regarding unrelated
issues, Chen reminds migrants to sign contracts with future employers. 134 He
also teaches his callers to refer to migrant rights and legal aid providers in conversations with their employers to demonstrate that they have a basic awareness
of their rights and possible avenues of relief. Chen considers his messages as
encouragement for migrant self-improvement and characterizes his message as a
step toward social equality for migrants. As a migrant himself, Chen feels that
this is an important distinction; he promotes his hotline as means to foster an
independent grassroots migrant community.
133 As a result of the sponsorship, Chen began to use a more organized approach to his venture and
itemized his costs on a receipt which he distributed to his sponsors.
134 Like more formally trained counterparts, Chen is aware of the inherit problem with insisting on
contracts. Migrants insisting on contracts are less likely to find employment because there is an abundance of labor, and employers may see those migrants as potential troublemakers.
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Chen does not believe that formal legal aid-even if it continues its rapid
expansion-could provide significant assistance to addressing the issues of migrants.135 Instead, Chen believes that only pro-active migrants can foster significant improvements to legal issues facing migrants. Chen feels that his migrantsponsored hotline furthers his primary goal of educating and empowering the
migrant population.
V.

The Goals of and Relationships between Legal Aid Organizations

As can be seen above, legal aid for migrants in Beijing is provided through a
variety of institutions running the full spectrum of government support and recognition.' 36 As a result, these providers have developed different strategies in
serving migrants, even as their resource limitations have required the interaction
between them to increase.
A.

Legal Aid's Goals in Addressing Migrant Disputes

The goals of Chinese legal aid services are multifaceted. Besides the overarching, shared goal of resolving individual disputes, these goals include exercising social control, increasing rights consciousness among migrants themselves,
advocating for change in migrant legal and social protections, and even utilizing
migrant cases to further legal pedagogy among new practitioners. Clearly, these
goals are fluid and not mutually exclusive; individuals working within each provider's system may feel that he or she is providing aid for reasons completely
different those of the provider itself. Nevertheless, whether by a providers' own
choice, a sponsor's recommendation, or in reaction to the needs of their migrant
clients, migrant legal aid providers largely focus on one or two of the four identified goals. Interestingly, the strategies adopted by each provider to assist migrants would vary depending on the dominance of particular goals.
1. Legal Aid for Migrants as a Means of Exercising Social Stability
Government legal aid also has the goal of settling social unrest, but processing
cases as quickly as possible to minimize unrest may override the goal of actually
resolving disputes. In Beijing, city-financed legal aid operates to both directly
serve migrant clients and as a means of symbolizing the government's stance
against the exploitation of migrant workers. City-financed legal aid thus strategically publicizes its migrant cases as a means of demonstrating that the government is following through with its promise to empower migrant workers and to
135 Chen acknowledges that there have been some improvements in the migrants' status under the law
since he moved to Beijing. He noted that the government had recently identified migrants as a protected
class of people. The importance of such an action does not stem only from the protection itself, but given
the significance Chinese society has traditionally given names, the mere naming of migrant workers as a
class has elevated the standing of migrants within cities.
136 See supra Part III; see also Liebman, supra note 8, at 224-37 (profiling five models of legal aid).
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deter migrant exploitation. 137 While government-sponsored legal aid may be the
only provider whose main goal appears to be maintaining social stability, it is
also the most robust, well-known, and consulted provider.13 8 To a large degree,
this means that the de facto purpose of most legal aid efforts is directed towards
maintaining social control.
When asked about their office's most significant effects on the migrant population, legal aid directors did not describe the services they provided or the individuals assisted, but instead referred to their office's encouragement of social
stability and the potential impact on employers' treatment of migrants. 39 The
term fada, which roughly translates as "develop prosperously," was used to describe both the developments in migrant legal aid and Beijing's growing economy and infrastructure. 40 Individual migrant cases that may not further these
goals may be weeded out through the provider's extensive screening processes.
This could be particularly problematic for migrant plaintiffs seeking to file politi14 1
cally sensitive suits.
The city legal aid office's emphasis on its symbolic influence rather than actual services may also stem from more pragmatic reasons: Beijing's legal aid
offices currently lack the resources necessary to serve the needs of the migrant
population. According to the district director, 80% of her office's caseload since
2003 is migrant-related. The astronomical number of migrant workers also
makes it imperative for the central government to control this population in order
to maintain national stability. With three million migrants in Beijing, government-sponsored legal aid offices have recently begun to adopt strategies to try to
lower the number of migrant clients they serve, even as they steer increasingly
toward symbolic action.
Finally, the city legal aid office's emphasis on the symbolic-wherein the appearance of providing aid may be as important, if not more so, than the actual
aid-also has a historical basis. Chinese law has traditionally been characterized
and criticized as simply implementing government policies and maintaining social stability. 142 The hukou system 14 3 and sporadic law enforcement campaigns
against migrant encampments 44 are earlier examples of the Beijing's largely unsuccessful attempts to use law to implement migrant policy and prevent social
137 See, e.g., INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/13/content_282
251 1_7.htm (highlighting the improvements in the provision of legal aid to migrant workers).
138 By way of comparison, there are 3,023 government-sponsored legal aid organizations, while only
thirty universities have established legal aid clinics. Id.
139 See Director Interview, supra note 89. More interestingly, this legal aid provider sees migrant
legal aid as an extension of the nation's more general goals of economic and social expansion.
140 Id.

141 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 276; see also CECC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 135-36
(2006) (reporting that the government has restricted representation for suits alleging government abuses).
142 Support for such an ideological approach to law has a long history in China, including the closing
moments of Zhang Yimou's 2002 film Yingxiong ("Hero").
143 See generally SOLINGER, supra note 1; Mallee, supra note 2.
144 See generally, Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants, supra note 4.
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unrest. The shift in central government policy toward raising awareness of migrant issues and assisting the entire demographic is part and parcel of the latest
government campaign to maintain social stability.
Legal Aid as a Means of Migrant Empowerment

2.

Other non-governmental legal aid organizations also voiced quelling social
unrest as a goal, but with a different emphasis and hence, a different strategy.
Mirroring government legal aid, several community legal aid providers such as
the advocacy firm and the migrant-led initiatives render services because they
hope to empower migrants to express themselves in court and to raise migrants'
consciousness of individual rights.' 45 These providers hope that such empowerment will help migrants integrate within the Beijing community. 14 6 These providers advocate for migrants with the hope that advocacy will offer a means for
migrants to become stakeholders in their adopted communities.
These providers argue that migrant laborers are often exploited in Beijing not
because there are no laws defining migrants' rights, but simply because migrants
are typically unaware of these rights. Providers note that migrants are often unable to speak out affirmatively to prevent abuse or to seek legal action when
abuses do occur. When abuses do occur and migrants bring cases against employers, their legal actions are often stillborn, since migrants do not know to sign
contracts or establish some other proof of employment before beginning work.
Thus, migrant community-based providers direct their legal aid efforts largely
toward outreach programs, describing basic personal, employment, and housing
laws to migrants in the hopes of preventing abuse. Notably, however, this goal
requires that legal institutions through which empowered migrants seek redress
can adequately address migrant needs. In this sense, this goal illustrates legal
aid's delicate balance between advocating for change and at the same time, rely47
ing on the Chinese legal system.1

3. Legal Aid for Migrants as a Means of Advocating for Change in Migrant
Legal Status

A third goal among some migrant legal aid providers is advocacy for change
in social and legal norms. Advocacy law firms tout this as their primary goal;
their strategy is not to contact as many migrants as possible, but to gather data
and formulate policy recommendations for submission to relevant authorities.
Their reports outline migrants' roles in urban society or advocate for specific
reforms to migrant-related statutes.' 48 Some articles, often funded by governSee Advocacy Attorneys, supra note 1; Migrant Women's Organization, supra note 126.
See Advocacy Attorneys, supra note 1; Migrant Women's Organization, supra note 126.
147 See Austin Sarat, Access to Justice, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1911 (1980-81) (book review) ("Access to justice is both evocative and double-edged: It argues for legal change, yet reaffirms faith in law
and legal procedure and in the justice they provide").
148 Examples of article titles from a May 2005 publication produced by the advocacy law firm interviewed for this paper included "Migrant's Economic Contributions," "Delay of Migrant Payment," "Reasons for Migrants' Current Status," and "Simplify the Labor Procedures." (On file with the authors).
145
146
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ment bodies, highlight discrepancies between official statistics and their own calculations of migrant numbers and trends. Other articles attempt to describe
migrant situations from migrant perspectives.' 49 The advocacy law firm published detailed case studies of migrant cases they had successfully litigated, including detailed accounts of the facts of the case and procedural and substantive
approaches they utilized, in the hope that they could serve as guidelines for future
cases.' 50 The advocacy law firm must establish relationships with all sectors
(other legal aid, government, migrants) to ensure that their recommendations are
well received.
Legal aid organizations representing migrants with the intent of encouraging
migrant rights would sometimes use migrant cases litigated by other legal aid
providers as research for advocacy-driven reports. While the impacts of these
"joint advocacy" reports on governmental policy-makers are beyond the scope of
this paper, these advocacy papers will be circulated within the migrant legal aid
community. Notably, advocacy papers are rarely traded between two specific
organizations, but they are often made possible when there is express or inadvertent cooperation between multiple providers.
4.

Legal Aid for Migrants as a Pedagogical Tool

Finally, there is a pedagogical goal in migrant legal aid. Law school clinics are
developed to train student lawyers, while pro bono lawyers may wish to hone
their own skills. Migrants represent an ideal population for many students or
attorneys to develop their litigation skills. Their cases often present clear-cut and
egregious instances of injustice. There are many potential migrant cases available, many of which have similar general fact patterns, allowing more experienced
practitioners to guide newer ones. Individual migrant cases often involve dis,
creet substantive areas of law, allowing providers to become intimately familiar
with a particular practice. As individual cases (collective cases are another matter), migrant cases are unlikely to disturb formal political interests because Beijing is making a conscious push to improve migrants' legal status. This allows
legal aid providers to continue training future practitioners without fear of being
shut down or having funding removed. Legal aid clinics tend to handle fewer
cases, but give each case greater attention.
Additionally, providers familiar with specific legal issues may deliberately
choose to provide formal or informal training to other legal aid providers. Training may be offered deliberately to encourage the spreading of migrant knowledge
149 For example, in an article addressing the reasons for payment delays, migrants were directly surveyed and were quoted liberally throughout the essay. (On file with the authors).
150 The firm described the case of a nineteen-year-old migrant graduate of a parochial school who was
hired, under contract, to work as a secretary. After a month of work, the migrant was fired and did not
receive any wages for hours worked or compensation for the sum she spent on transportation to and from
the office. Upset, she contacted the firm through their hotline. The firm represented the migrant in
negotiation and eventually secured 450 RMB, a fraction of the amount the girl was owed (580 RMB is
the minimum monthly wage for legally-hired employees in Beijing). The "success" of this case would
seem dubious to practitioners reading this case study, however, in addition to providing free legal services, the firm absorbed the costs of court filing fees and the client's travel expenses. These costs were
far in excess of 580 RMB.
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of legal rights. In other circumstances, less-formally trained legal aid providers
acquire rudimentary legal knowledge merely by working with other providers.
This training and exchange marks yet another form of interrelationship between
legal aid organizations.
In sum, government legal aid, while representing a seismic shift in the way the
government perceives and addresses migrants, maintains social stability as its
goal. By contrast, migrant-sponsored legal initiatives arguably have more migrant-empowerment goals, and see utilization of courts as a means of advancing
"rights-consciousness." School-sponsored migrant clinics, meanwhile, in receiving financial support from foreign NGOs and operating under the purview of the
government, must simultaneously balance the needs and restrictions of working
within an academic environment.
B.

Cooperation and Limitations among Migrant Legal Aid Providers

Legal aid organizations increasingly do not work in isolation. Due to the need
for additional resources, providers have, by choice or necessity, established formal and informal networks to service and reach the migrant population. Since
individual legal aid providers have different, if not contrary, goals, each provider
may be better suited for certain specific tasks. But several official and unofficial
working relationships have emerged between the organizations. Out of necessity,
these organizations are coordinating and interacting in a way that generates a
legal culture that can be called "public-minded."
Not all of the migrant organizations are willing or capable of advising or representing every migrant who comes in the door. Those that do represent migrants
often establish parameters about the clients they can represent and the scope of
that representation. Legal aid organizations often recommend migrants they cannot personally assist to other organizations better suited to the migrants' needs.
Individual migrant cases are passed off to other groups in hopes that another
organization may be better equipped or more willing to address specific cases.
Cooperation between organizations entails an exchange in expertise.
When individual cases are referred to different legal aid providers, migrants
are ideally directed toward providers whose goals are more closely tailored to the
client's needs. In some circumstances, such as when government-sponsored legal aid directs migrants toward pro bono attorneys uninterested in migrant issues,
this aim may not be exactly realized.' 5' In other cases, such as when migrant-run
community based organizations direct individual migrants to the advocacy firm,
the former is generally very clear about the latter's goals and the types of cases it
typically takes.15 2 In these circumstances, both organizations work toward providing migrants with the most appropriate aid possible. However, whether an
individual client receives appropriate aid in these circumstances is then dictated
151 See Michelson, supra note 25, at 210-11 (reporting that Beijing's private attorneys typically dislike performing legal aid work assigned to them and try to shunt such cases to lower-level associates,
which is possible because the cases are assigned to the firm rather than the individual attorney).
152 See Migrant Women's Organization, supra note 126.
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by an element of chance-whether
the first provider they contact can redirect
53
them successfully. 1
Legal aid organizations also benefit more directly from cooperation. Legal aid
providers with less experience gain greater knowlege by working with more experienced providers. On the other hand, less-experienced providers, such as the
migrant advocate Mr. Chen, sometimes have closer relationships with the migrant community than their better-trained counterparts, such as the advocacy
firm.1 5 4 Organizations are able to educate each other as well as able to pass on
such legal knowledge to migrants directly.
The relationship between the city-sponsored legal aid provider and the advocacy firm further demonstrates the impact of expertise exchanges. The advocacy
firm readily accepts cases from the city-sponsored legal aid clinic-a welcome
relief for the overworked government-sponsored provider.15 5 In taking on these
cases, the advocacy firm broadened its capacity to locate cases to further its research and maximized the resources it has dedicated to finding appropriate cases
themselves. The advocacy firm also uses this relationship with governmentsponsored entities to serve as a conduit for two-way communication and influence the migrant policies established by the central government.1 56
C.

The Effect of Legal Aid's Differing Goals and Interaction on Migrants

Despite their differing goals, the relationships between these organizations ultimately have increased migrant access to courts.' 5 7 Given the limited success
migrants have traditionally had in the legal system, it is perhaps unsurprising that
many of them have become disenchanted with the system as a whole and with the
individual providers established to assist them.' 58 Migrants are not docile players in this relationship. They are increasingly savvy in utilizing both the recent
media attention focused on them and the resources of multiple providers in their
attempt to access justice. 59 As we noted earlier, some migrants themselves have
established their own forms of legal aid specifically to increase the migrant popu160
lation's usage of other providers' resources.
153 See infra Part V.C. (illustrating the difficulty migrants faced in receiving aid after being rebuffed
by private attorneys and government legal aid).
154 See Migrant Activist, supra note 130 (explaining that the activist regularly directs cases towards
the advocacy firm and learns basic legal principles, such as the importance of written contracts, through
this relationship).
155 See Advocacy Attorneys, supra note 1.
156 Id. (stating that their firm often uses its relationship with government-sponsored legal aid and
government officials to further the impact of their publications on the plight of migrants).
157 See supra notes 70-77 (explaining the recent extension of legal aid to migrants).
158 See generally Gallagher, supra note 12 (contending that legal aid plaintiffs' experience with the
legal system leads to disenchantment, but also to better informed action).
159 See supra Part IV.B.4 (describing a case study wherein a migrant client used a university-sponsored legal aid clinic to further his specific goal of having a trained student attorney present his own

research and preparation in a courtroom).
160 See supra Parts IV.B.5 and 6.
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Migrants understand that providers have different goals and some have learned
to treat legal aid more as a buffet than as a single entrde. They consult several
parallel organizations at once in hopes of being directed to an organization that
may ultimately assist them.' 6' Legal aid providers are beginning to understand
how migrants seek legal aid, and adapt their procedures
to accommodate this
62
buffet-style approach in seeking access to courts.1
Although migrants are increasingly savvy in seeking legal assistance, the different policies and goals of legal aid offices have had a disparate impact on migrants. For migrants, this system can be overwhelming. When they are directed
from one provider to another, some cannot continue to earn wages since seeking
assistance can be a time-consuming endeavor. Furthermore, new-found employment can invalidate eligibility to receive legal aid. Mundane tasks such as traveling across the city to meet with providers, leasing a cell phone to communicate
for meetings, renting a place to live, or purchasing food in the expensive city can
prove prohibitively expensive for migrants attempting to bring legal action.
Where in some extreme cases, providing aid to migrants is only tangentially related to a provider's actual goals, the nature and quality of service received by an
individual client is often mixed.
While the increased interaction between legal aid providers is encouraging in
some respects, it can also be problematic. The more aid providers pass off migrants to other providers, the more the migrants' lack of income and continued
expenditures cumulate. This leaves migrants to reconsider whether pursuing legal action is worth the continued financial, emotional, or even physical costs.
Migrant cases that are eventually litigated, therefore, are the exceptional ones,
representing a combination of determined migrant litigants and a timely cooperation by a relevant legal aid provider or a group of providers working efficiently
together.
VI.

Case Study in Migrant Access to the Courts

The following case study illustrates the tortuous course of migrant laborers
seeking legal assistance but also how they affirmatively advocated their case.
The case involved two migrants seeking to recover back wages from a Beijingbased employer. As the migrants were directed to different providers, they
quickly compiled a surprisingly in-depth understanding of how each provider
could or could not assist them and the limitations of the legal system itself.
In March 2004, about two dozen men from Guanyuan Guangyuan city in
Sichuan province, ranging in age from twenty to fifty-eight, arrived in Beijing
seeking work as unskilled construction workers. Most were distantly related to
each other; all of them were connected by their common dialect, shared background, and outsider status in the city. Only four or five of them had previously
161 See Interview with migrant plaintiffs, in Beijing (July 27, 2005) [hereinafter Migrant Plaintiffs].
Unless otherwise noted, all information in Part V.C is derived from this interview. It was conducted with
the assistance of the student attorney representing the migrant plaintiffs. At the migrants' request, this
interview was not recorded.
162 See University Clinic, supra note 118.
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worked in Beijing in construction, but none expected or wanted to stay in Beijing. Largely uneducated, they elected one of their more savvy members-a
thirty-two year-old surnamed Chen-to serve as their spokesman in finding
work. Chen left behind his wife and seven-year-old son and sporadic work as an
electrician to seek work in Beijing. Chen planned to use money he saved from
construction to allow his son to continue his education beyond elementary
school.
Upon arriving in Beijing, Chen and his tongbao met a Sichuan province migrant, surnamed Liao, who had worked in Beijing for a number of years. For a
portion of their expected wages, Liao promised to contact a local manager who
needed migrants to create the mortar for a building contract. 6 3 Liao asked for
one-half of an RMB for each eleven RMB the tongbao earned. 164 The rate was
agreed to orally, with no representatives for the developer present. This rate
made Chen suspicious, since xiao laoban-the lower level bosses-often take a
portion of one-and-a-half RMB per eleven RMB earned. While discussing the
situation with two other migrant representatives who were offered the same
deal-Pang, an older man representing four migrants and Wang, a thirty-four
year-old former farmer representing twenty migrants-they told Chen to inform
them when Liao was given wages for distribution.165
163 Chen referred to Liao as a xiao laoban-a"small employer"-meaning that Liao was a migrant
entrepreneur one step closer to the source of payment. The man who had hired Liao to find laborers, in
turn, was probably another xiao laoban who also kept a portion of the payment handed down. Chen did
not know of any individuals closer to the developer than Liao's "superior." Chen suspected that there
were probably six or seven layers of xiao laoban between the migrants and the developers. Though
Beijing illegalized the labor practice in recent reforms, this feudal hierarchy remains common and allows
developers to unofficially create a business structure without establishing direct contact or relationships
with the almost any of the migrant laborers working on a.building project. See also Yuan & Wong, supra
note 50, at 103, 106 (describing the hierarchy of relationships between migrants and bosses on a typical
construction site in Beijing). According to Chen, migrant workers often do not even know who is funding the projects they are building. With so many layers of middle-men involved in hiring migrant labor,
Chen estimated that only fifty to sixty percent of the money paid by developers eventually reaches the
migrant workers.
164 For each square meter of mortar a team of migrants lays out, the team was promised eleven RMB.
According to Chen, a team of six migrants working ten or more hours a day can lay out 4,000 square
meters over a six-month period if they work everyday. Teams are paid upon the completion of the
construction site in order to ensure that migrants do not leave the site midway through the job and
facilitate the calculation of the amount of work completed. In theory, migrants could each earn over
1,200 RMB for each month's work, a staggering improvement over the 400 or 500 RMB households earn
each month in the village when there is work available. However, in addition to the percentage that xiao
laoban take, migrants have additional costs to work at a construction site. Though they are provided free
housing-un-heated and un-cooled rooms filled with over a dozen men and women per room-and a
bathroom to share with up to 100 other migrants, workers are docked eight RMB every day to pay for the
three meals provided by the developers. These meals usually consist of boiled rice and a few vegetables,
fare that would cost less than a fraction of an RMB in a local market. Since they lack access to cash,
migrants can only buy marked-up food or cigarettes-a nearly ubiquitous habit-by purchasing supplies
from developer-run stands. Some migrants borrow cash from local foreman on credit to buy rice or other
foodstuffs beyond the workplace. A 2003 amendment to the statutes governing migrant worker rights
has made the payment of migrants upon completion of a job or the garnishing of wages for food unlawful. Violations of these amendments remain rampant, however, as there have been almost no legal actions brought against violators.
165 Chen knew from experience that migrants were sometimes cheated out of their full wages. By his
estimation, migrants lost a modest amount of the wages-I 10 to 200 RMB---once or twice for every ten
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Chen, Pang, Wang, and their respective tongbao worked on the construction
site for six months. Upon completion of the project around September 27, 2004,
the three migrant representatives learned that Liao had stolen their wages several
days earlier, in violation of a 2003 statute requiring migrants to be paid directly.
When they discovered that Liao had absconded with their wages, they contacted
Liao's "superior" in the wage-distribution hierarchy, who in turn claimed that his
hands were tied. The superior and Liao both hailed from the same county, leading Chen and Wang to suspect that they had conspired to steal the wages. The
migrant representatives then attempted to contact the developer. The developer
disclaimed responsibility to the individual migrants, stating that he had already
distributed the full amount to Liao, and recommended that they find Liao themselves. Both Chen and Wang agreed that given the size of Beijing and their
meager resources, locating Liao was nearly impossible. According to the migrants, they were denied ninety thousand RMB of wages.
The three migrant representatives eventually decided to approach the legal aid
office in Beijing's Haidian district, their local government-sponsored bureau.
The migrants were slow to arrive at this decision-traveling to the legal aid office was difficult given the size of Beijing. Finding safety in numbers, the migrants were also generally hesitant to travel alone. If all of the migrants left at
the same time, however, the developers could refuse to allow reentry or deny
knowing them. If a substantial fraction of the migrant workers left the worksite
with the representatives, the developers could grow suspicious and forcibly remove the migrants staying at the site. As it were, several of the migrants decided
to cut their losses and leave the camp either to return home or to find new work
elsewhere. The remainder initially stayed on the worksite, paying rent but not
working, preventing the developer from bringing in new workers. A few migrants from both Chen and Wang's tongbao accepted small cash payments of
1,000 RMB and 3,600 RMB from the employer-a fraction of what they were
owed-and agreed to leave the worksite.166 Seeing their leverage and perceived
safety in numbers dwindle, the three groups of remaining migrants decided to
pool their numbers together to facilitate efforts to seek help from legal aid
offices.
When the migrants arrived at the Haidian district legal aid, caseworkers told
the migrants that the district office could not-or at least would not-address the
migrants' problems and directed them to the Beijing legal aid office, which had
more case-workers. The migrants went to the Beijing office, a much farther and
more challenging trip, but the Beijing office claimed that they lacked jurisdiction
and referred the case back to the Haidian office. Upon revisiting the Haidian
office, the Haidian caseworker again claimed that he lacked authority to address
the migrants' cases. Beyond a cursory understanding of their situation, neither of
the legal aid centers looked into the legal merits of the case.
jobs undertaken. Though the amount is significant to the migrants, they considered the burden of disputing this amount as too troublesome to pursue.
166 The payments were handed to the migrants by safety inspectors who were not directly employed
by the developer, allowing the developer to maintain that it had no official working relationship with the
migrants.
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The migrants opted not to continue seeking aid from the government legal aid
bureau. Instead, they sought assistance from an administrative office addressing
labor issues (siji qing laodong ke). With the threat of the bureau investigating
and reporting corporate construction violations, the developer cooperated. The
developer did not dispute the migrants' statements, but refused to pay the entirety
of the ninety thousand RMB. Because it was the Chinese New Year, a holiday
where work is set aside and family is emphasized, the bureau relied on the "holiday spirit" to ask the developer for at least partial reparations to allow the migrants to return home. The developer agreed to pay for a portion of the back
wages for this purpose. On December 26, a team of five of Chen's tongbao
received ten thousand RMB while eleven members of Wang's tongbao received
thirty thousand for their work. 167 Referring to the payment as "going home
money," the developer hoped that these payments would end the dispute. Several
of the migrants accepted this offer and left Beijing nearly a year later, bringing
home a fraction of the wages they were owed.
The remainder of the migrants, however, remained in Beijing, seeking to collect the outstanding fifty thousand RMB they felt they were still owed. Initially
believing that a lawyer would not accept their case, these migrants next approached the local workers' bureau office (laodong ju) for assistance. The
caseworker at the workers' bureau who heard their case sympathized with the
situation but could not guarantee any action on the migrants' behalf. For three
months, the migrants visited the office several times each week to plead their
case, to little avail. During these three months, the migrants did not take on any
new jobs. 168 The bureau did help them procure temporary housing at a construction site dormitory, where their rent was deferred. The administrative bureau
also sent a representative on-site to investigate the migrants' case. Eventually,
the worker's bureau fined the employer for the amount it would cost to send the
migrants back home to their home province. After the migrants learned that the
bureau had collected the payment from the developer, the migrants visited the
bureau three times in as many weeks before receiving payment. Disheartened,
most of the migrants accepted this partial payment and returned home. Of the
sixteen who went to their home province, five returned to attempt to collect their
wages. 169 Others, who had returned in earlier months, returned to Beijing to
support Chen and Wang's attempt to recover their losses.
While the migrants were confined to their shelter for three months, they began
to learn more about their rights, from other migrants and by reading newspapers.
167 The bureau required a receipt for this transaction, which contained signatures from all of the migrant representatives. No representative from the developer signed this receipt. This document would
turn out to be the only record indicating that the migrants had worked for the developer.
168 In part, this was because during the Chinese New Year, construction jobs were scarce. Since
canvassing for the few available jobs would require the migrants to travel away from their construction
site, the migrants opted to stay closer to their former employer to ensure that they could collect their
damages.
169 Chen and Wang stayed in the city during the holiday period to ensure that the developer would not
disappear. At one point when he was in the city himself, Chen received a telephone call in the middle of
the night. One of the developer's overseers offered to provide Chen with some money if he were to meet
the overseer immediately. Fearing for his safety, Chen refused to meet the caller.
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These migrants tried to contact the few private lawyers with migrant-focused
practices, but soon found that either the lawyer's fees were far too high for them
to afford even a consultation or the lawyers were not interested because the case
lacked documentation or evidence. Through a newspaper advertisement, the migrant workers eventually contacted the Tsinghua University's student-run legal
aid program. After their case was presented to a student intake-worker, the
faculty advisor agreed to take the case. On March 22, 2005, three students were
assigned to work on the migrants' case.
Under guidance from their director, the students managed to bring the case
before a preliminary hearing with seventeen plaintiffs. The judge ruled that these
issues should be brought up as seventeen separate cases rather than as a collective case, and indicated that there was little to no evidence to support their
claims. Sensing that they had a weak case because of the court's relative disinterest and the dearth of evidence concerning the relationship between the migrants and the developers, the clinic representatives eventually recommended that
the migrants withdraw their case before being required to pay unrecoverable
court fees. Unable to risk more money and time away from work, the migrants
accepted the clinic's recommendation. More than a year after their xiao laoban
absconded with their money, the migrants withdrew their case without ever
presenting it in court. The Tsinghua legal aid clinic has not heard from this
group of migrants since. It is not clear at the time of this writing if the migrants
have pursued other legal means to recover their wages.
VII.

Conclusion

Migrant access to courts in Beijing is no longer an oxymoron. Despite significant obstacles, migrants have increasingly turned to the courts to redress their
grievances. This is the result of the state's desire to ensure stability by channeling its disgruntled citizens through a court system, the public's enhanced awareness of a legal means of redress, and the increasing availability of legal aid
services. Legal aid for migrants is also the result of the efforts of a variety of
actors: the Chinese government, semi-public institutions such as universities,
nongovernmental organizations, lawyers, and migrants themselves.
Although both governmental and public awareness of migrant issues has increased, migrants in Beijing remain a particularly vulnerable population. They
are outsiders in their own country's capital, set apart by a web of official and
unofficial discrimination, not to mention cultural and linguistic differences.
Their communities are perceived by officials and fellow citizens as a potential
threat to social stability, and they face the possibility of displacement and abuse.
In the last few years, legal aid providers in Beijing have attempted to provide
migrants with a forum to address some of these wrongs. These providers serve
not only as migrants' gatekeepers to the court system, but as transmitters of legal
norms. In many cases, legal aid providers are not simply advocates, but counselors and instructors who teach migrants about the existence of their rights.
Yet the variety of legal aid providers and the differing goals they serve can be
daunting to migrants. These goals range from enforcing social control to emVolume 4, Issue 2
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powering the migrant population to promoting social change. Legal aid providers are hampered, to differing degrees, by resource limitation, legal training, and
recognition by state agencies. Out of necessity, however, they have begun to
form cooperative relationships with each other. Since migrant-provider relationships are established as often through convenience and serendipity as they are
through similarities between client needs and provider methods, the actual services provided vary widely. In some cases, such as in school-sponsored legal aid
clinics, the pedagogical value of migrant cases for law students may overshadow
the goal of providing successful legal aid to individual migrants. In sum, the
increased variety of legal aid services may result paradoxically in migrants having more difficulty finding services appropriate for their needs.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that legal aid will not unilaterally
change the plight of migrants within the city without additional reforms. At its
worst, legal aid for migrants may only offer migrants false hope and inform
would-be oppressors which individual migrants are troublemakers. From the migrant's perspective, even a victorious case may not necessarily be helpful. In the
absence of real social change in other areas of their life, a migrant's ability to file
lawsuits is unlikely to change their social situation significantly. Chen Jun, the
migrant hotline operator introduced above, provides a sadly ironic example of
this: even as he reaches out to migrant callers seeking deliverance from70 their
grievances, Beijing University housing is dispossessing him of his land.'
Despite these lingering questions, though, the mere fact that migrant legal aid
is available is an encouraging sign. Although legal aid's approach to problems
facing China's migrant population could be cynically described as a band-aid on
a wound, the Chinese government's tacit support of the various legal aid agencies
suggests that Beijing's migrant population may serve as an incubator for ideas
and best practices for rights advocacy in China as a whole.
Tensions within China's legal aid and its migrant population provide insight
into how China's legal system may develop. Legal aid providers focus a significant portion of their efforts towards raising migrants' rights consciousness.
Given migrants' propensity to operate as their own underground society and the
ever-increasing formal and informal lines of communication among migrant
groups, it seems reasonable to presume that rights-consciousness among migrants
will continue to grow. As a result, the vulnerable-and previously invisibleurban population of migrants will quickly become knowledgeable about the concept of their rights as individuals.
Similarly, the scale of potential migrant cases may force the Chinese legal
system to develop quickly. Legal aid must not only continue to service more
migrants, but must also begin to more consistently provide victorious outcomes.
Already, the government's adjustment of its legal aid practices, acknowledgment
of school-sponsored clinics and tacit support of similar private enterprises suggests that Chinese legal system is trying to adjust to this wave of litigation. If
such services meet the demands of migrant litigants, the developing judicial sys170
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tem may grow in a direction that legitimizes the rights of China's most vulnerable groups.
In the long run, access to the court system may provide migrants with a key
weapon in the arsenal of individual rights. But given the inconclusive results
faced by migrants in the courts today, this weapon has yet to be equated with the
ability to redress grievances effectively. Perhaps, then, the most that legal aid
offices can be credited with currently is adding to the rising expectation among
the Chinese that law and the legal system can and should be used to address their
grievances. Ultimately, however, the true impact of these organizations may become clear-with sufficient funding and social support, these providers have the
potential to agitate for migrant rights, deter abuses, and help raise the status of
China's migrants to that of full-fledged citizens. For now, the existence of these
organizations themselves, and the developing coordination amongst them, suggest the promise of a "civil society."
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